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COVERT WAR AND CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY:
HIDDEN WAR AND FORGOTTEN POWER
JULES LOBELt
Relying on private armies to achieve foreign policy goals is a prac-
tice of ancient origin. In the two centuries prior to the adoption of the
United States Constitution, paramilitary groups were used extensively,
particularly in naval warfare.' The newly independent American Re-
public also relied almost exclusively on private citizens to fight its bat-
tles at sea.2 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Constitution contains a pro-
vision dealing specifically with the authorization of private individuals
to commit acts of violence against foreign governments. Article I, sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to issue commis-
sions known in the eighteenth century as "letters of marque and repri-
sal,"3 which permit private individuals to use force against foreign
nations.' This power has lain dormant for over 150 years, and has not
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1 See infra text accompanying notes 39-47.
2 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
3 "The Congress shall have Power To. . .grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal
." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
4 Letters of marque and reprisal were issued by sovereign states either to individ-
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been utilized since the War of 1812.1 As governmental control over
warfare increased in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, the
reliance on private armies and navies gradually diminished in both
America and Europe.6
Since the delegation of war-making to private individuals now
seems like a quaint custom from our colorful past, it is not surprising
that the marque and reprisal clause has been largely ignored in the war
powers debate of the last two decades.' Ironically, however, the contem-
porary world has revived the methods of warfare prevalent before the
Constitution was adopted. As they did in the medieval and early mod-
ern periods, governments now often rely on nongovernmental surrogate
armies to fight their battles.8 Because of the recent reluctance of Con-
gress to authorize and the public to accept direct use of American
troops in military combat, the United States has turned to private in-
surgents to achieve the military overthrow of governments considered
undesirable.9
uals who had been injured abroad authorizing them to use force to seize property from
the wrongdoer state or its subjects, or to armed merchant or private warships authoriz-
ing them to capture ships and cargoes belonging to citizens of a third state. See F.
GROB, THE RELATIVITY OF WAR AND PEACE 238-39 (1949).
1 See id.;.A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
271 (1976).
1 See A. HINDMARSH, FORCE IN PEACE 52-54 (1933).
But see Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 680 n.28 (1972). Lofgren, who discusses the clause briefly
in his article, is a notable exception. See id. at 692-96; see also W. REVELEY, WAR
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 63-64, 86, 102 (1981) (discussing the
treatment of the marque and reprisal clause by the framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution).
B See Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 712 (1958); Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue
to Decision, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 252, 259-60 (J.
Moore ed. 1974).
1 On the development of the CIA's aid to the Nicaraguan contras, see Ignatius
and Rogers, How C.I.A.-Aided Raids In Nicaragua in '84 Led Congress to End
Funds, Wall St. J., March 6, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Ignatius and Rogers, Why the Covert
War In Nicaragua Evolved and Hasn't Succeeded, Wall St. J., March 5, 1985, at 1,
col. 1. On the policy of aiding Afghan guerrillas, see Girardet, Arming Afghan Guer-
rillas: Perils, Secrecy, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 20, 1984, at 15, col. 2. On aid to
the Cambodian insurgents, see Govertzman, U.S. May Help 2 Rebel Groups of
Cambodians, N.Y. Times, April 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
In the last few years, the American military has revived special operations of both
unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency that include "countering hostile insur-
gents, most often by training, organizing, and even leading indigenous units, as was
done in the Montagnard hill tribes of Vietnam." Mohr, Military After Vietnam:
Stronger Force Emerges, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1985, at Al, col. 1, B6, col. 1. In a
related area, in 1984, administration officials approved a policy whereby the CIA and
military personnel began financing, training, sharing information, and supporting for-
eign groups in other nongovernmental ways in order to combat terrorism. See Taylor,
Lebanese Group Linked to C.LA. is Tied to Car Bombing Fatal to 80, N.Y. Times,
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It is often argued that the intent of the Framers is not entitled to
great weight in the foreign affairs area because of the major technologi-
cal and political changes in the conduct of foreign policy and modern
warfare in the last century." The escalation of the nuclear weapons
race, however, has made direct armed confrontation between major
powers potentially annihilating, and thus has led to a reversion to the
forms of warfare prevalent two hundred years ago."1 The views of the
Framers, therefore, as to which branch of government should authorize
private armies is particularly relevant today.
The use of private armies raises serious constitutional questions
concerning the respective powers of Congress and the president in cov-
ert paramilitary warfare. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
the administrations of several presidents have asserted that the execu-
tive has the power to authorize the use of covert paramilitary force, 2
an assertion supported by some commentators."3 The executive has fre-
May 13, 1985 at Al, col. 3. This policy came to light when people hired by a Lebanese
counterterrorism unit that had been working with the CIA planted a car bomb in Bei-
rut that killed more than 80 people. See id.
10 See, e.g., U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-81, 161 (1967); OFFICE OF THE
LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE LEGALITY OF UNITED STATES PAR-
TICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF VIET NAM, reprinted in Legality of United States
Participation in the Viet Nam Conflict, 75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1101 (1966).
"I See A. JORDAN & W. TAYLOR, AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICY
AND PROCESS 29, 35-37 (1981) (stating that the threat of total annihilation resulting
from nuclear war has diminished the importance of conventional forms of war on the
international scene). International conflicts are thus currently resolved in decentralized,
"low-intensity" battles, which typically arise in politically unstable third world nations.
See Taylor & Maaranen, Introduction, in THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT IN THE 1980s
4-6 (W. Taylor & S. Maaranen eds. 1982). The means of engaging in these "low-
intensity" conflicts-"coercive diplomacy, terrorism, subversion, revolutionary war, and
limited military actions"-id. at 4, have some impbrtant features in common with the
forms of warfare practiced in the two centuries prior to the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. See A. JORDAN & W. TAYLOR, supra, at 35-37.
12 The Ford administration argued that covert action could be undertaken by the
president because of the president's inherent constitutional power with respect to the
conduct of foreign affairs. See U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and
Control of Foreign Intelligence: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Intelli-
gence, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1729-34 (1975) (statement of Mitchell Rogovin, Special
Counsel to the Director of the CIA) [hereinafter House Intelligence Hearings].
The Carter administration opposed certain restraints as "excessive intrusion by the
Congress into the President's exercise of his powers under the Constitution." S.2284:
Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-19
(1980) (prepared statement of Stansfield Turner, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency).
13 See, e.g., Military Posture and H.R. 11500: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1604 (1976) (Letter from Eugene
Rostow to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Re-
spect to Intelligence Activities, Sept. 29, 1975) [hereinafter Military Hearings]; High-
smith, Policing Executive Adventurism: Congressional Oversight of Military and
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quently argued that, under modern cold war conditions, authority over
covert activities is necessary to the effective and successful conduct of
foreign relations and the protection of national security and is thus an
inherent presidential power. 4 Congress has not vigorously disputed
these claims; 5 in fact, it has enacted statutes that appear to permit
Paramilitary Operations, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 327, 374 (1982) (arguing for con-
gressional oversight, but noting that paramilitary operations that pose a lesser risk of
"full-scale war" could constitutionally be undertaken without the prior approval of
Congress); Note, The Exteni of Independent Presidential Authority to Conduct For-
eign Intelligence Activities, 72 GEo. L.J. 1855 (1984). A Wall Street Journal editorial
recently argued that furnishing assistance to the Nicaraguan contras is an executive
power that can be exercised irrespective of congressional authorization. See Commander
in Chief, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1986, at A30, col. 1.
14 See Memorandum to Lawrence Houston, General Counsel to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, on the Constitutional and Legal Basis for So-Called Covert Activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency, reprinted in THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 714
(T. Fain, K. Plant & R. Milloy eds. 1977) [hereinafter Houston Memorandum].
"I Senator Eagleton, an original sponsor of the War Powers Resolution, proposed
an amendment to the resolution that would have "restrict[edl the practice of employing
regular or irregular foreign forces to engage in 'proxy' wars to achieve policy objectives
never specifically approved by Congress." 119 CONG. REc. 25,079 (1973) (statement of
Senator Eagleton). Eagleton's amendment was opposed for procedural reasons. Several
senators feared that its enactment might prevent the entire resolution from securing
enough votes to override a presidential veto, and, more importantly, believed that it
would be better presented as part of a separate bill on covert action. See id. at 25,081-
82 (remarks of Senators Muskie, Javits, and Stennis). The amendment was rejected by
the Senate. See id. at 25,092.
Congress has on occasion limited funding for particular covert operations. The
Clark Amendment, enacted by Congress in 1976, prohibited any assistance to a group
that has the effect or purpose of aiding military operations in Angola. See International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 404, 90 Stat.
729, 757-58 (1976). The Clark Amendment was recently repealed by Congress and the
Reagan administration is now supporting aid to the Angolan rebels. See N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1985, at Al, col. 2; Fyerbringes, House Acts to Allow Angola Rebel Aid, N.Y.
Times, July 11, 1985, at A3, col. 4.
The Boland Amendment, which provided funds to the CIA, prohibited the use of
those funds to furnish any military equipment, training, advice, or other military sup-
port to paramilitary groups whose purpose was the overthrow of the government of
Nicaragua or the instigation of a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.
See Further Continuing Appropriations Act for 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96
Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Boland Amendment]. The administration
claimed that its aid to the contras was designed to interdict arms shipments from Nica-
ragua to El Salvador, a rationale that the House Intelligence Committee noted "strains
credibility." H.R. REP. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1983). The Committee,
therefore, was not certain whether "the present program (of covert aid) meets [the
law's] requirement." Id.
In 1983, after voting against aid, the House reached a compromise with the Sen-
ate, setting a $24 million cap on spending for military and paramilitary action against
the Sandinista government. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (1983). President Reagan's 1986 request for
$100 million in aid to the Nicaraguan contras was narrowly rejected by the House of
Representatives, but approved by the Senate. See O'Brien, Contra Aid Approved in the
Senate, Phila. Inquirer, Mar. 28, 1986, at 1, col. 5. On April 15, 1986, the House
approved a debating procedure that supporters of the contra aid said was designed to
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executive authorization of covert operations without congressional ap-
proval, subject only to reporting requirements." Despite Congress's
failure to assert power over paramilitary action against foreign govern-
ments, conflicts between the branches have arisen in the past, and the
future portends even greater controversy. Just as the Vietnam War
raised questions about the constitutional power to deploy United States
troops abroad in the absence of declared war, reliance on proxy armies
to fight wars that Americans do not want to fight themselves will inevi-
tably lead to a constitutional struggle over who has the power to engage
such forces."'
The use of private armies as an instrument of United States for-
eign policy also raises serious questions of international law. The rise
of private armies has led the United Nations General Assembly to in-
clude within the definition of aggression the use of force by nongovern-
mental groups sent out or controlled by a foreign nation." In addition,
kill or delay the aid. See Fuerbringer, Contras' Backers Lose A Close Vote on House
Debate, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 2. Under the procedure, the contra aid
would be attached to a $1.7 billion catchall spending bill that is opposed by the Reagan
administration. See id.
" See Hughes-Ryan Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2422(a) (1982); Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for 1981, 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1982); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 268-351 (discussing possible delegation problems raised by the Intelligence
Authorization Act).
17 Indeed, congressional concern over executive control over covert paramilitary
operations has recently been increasing. See Englelberg, Rebel Aid Said to Strain Con-
gress-CIA Ties, N.Y. Times, April 22, 1986, at 4 (stating that Senator Leahy believes
Senate should address issues of covert paramilitary action). The House Intelligence
Committee has reported out a bill requiring that "any U.S. governmental support for
military or paramilitary operations in Angola be openly acknowledged and publicly
debated." H.R. REP. No. 508, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). In 1983 the House Intelli-
gence Committee held hearings on a bill that would have required congressional au-
thorization for "any clandestine paramilitary or military activity." Congressional Over-
sight of Covert Activities: Hearings Before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983). The proposed bill was not enacted.
For the academic debate over constitutional war powers raised by the Vietnam
War, see, e.g., 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 597-829 (R. Falk
ed. 1969); Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29 (1972); Lof-
gren, supra note 7; Rogers, Congress, the President, and the War Powers, 59 CALIF.
L. REV. 1194 (1971); Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 623 (1972).
1s See G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1974); see also Report of the Special Committee On the Question Of Defining
Aggression, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974) (sending
out armed bands qualifies as an act of aggression); G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 28) at 121, 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (stating that every state has the
duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging armed bands to violate the territory of
any other state); M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE
ACTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 112-15 (1962) (stating that
support to armed bands likely to make incursions into another state is an act of aggres-
sion for which states are internationally responsible); A. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS,
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the United Nations and other international bodies have turned their
attention to the problem of mercenaries.19 The recent case brought by
Nicaragua against the United States before the International Court of
Justice has addressed questions of the legality under international law
of private forces trained, organized, financed, or supplied by one state
to attack another.20
This Article argues that the marque and reprisal clause grants
Congress sole authority to authorize private individuals to use force
against another country or its citizens, whether in peacetime or during
declared war.2 1 The power to authorize and regulate CIA paramilitary
THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65-68 (1972) (distinguishing
direct and indirect aggression and stating that armed force by third parties constitutes
aggression); cf Pan American Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in the
Event of Civil Strife, Feb. 20, 1928, art. I, 46 Stat. 2749, T.S. 814 (parties to treaty
agree to try to prevent individuals from leaving their territory to go to another in order
to foment civil strife, and to disarm and intern rebel forces crossing their borders). See
generally B. FERENcz, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION (1975) (giving a doc-
umentary history of international efforts to define and limit armed incursions).
19 See, e.g., Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 39
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 43), U.N. Doc. A/39/43 (1984); see also International Con-
vention Against The Activities of Mercenaries, U.N. Doc. A/35/366/add. 1, at 10-16
(1980), reprinted in Note, Leashing the Dogs of War: Outlawing the Recruitment and
Use of Mercenaries, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 619-25 (1982) (United Nations conven-
tion outlawing mercenaries and calling for each nation to enact measures to punish
mercenaries).
Similarly, the Organization of African Unity has requested "all States of the world
to enact laws declaring the recruitment and training of mercenaries in their territories a
punishable crime and deterring their citizens from enlisting as mercenaries." O.A.U.
Doc. AHG/Res. 49 (IV) (Sept. 1967), reprinted in Cesner and Brant, Law of the
Mercenary: An International Dilemma, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 339, 364-65 (1977). By
1977, the O.A.U. had adopted the O.A.U. Convention for the Elimination of
Mercenarism in Africa, O.A.U. Doc. CM/817 (XXIX) Annex II Rev. 3 (1977). See
Note, supra, at 601 n.68. For the text of the 1972 version of the Convention, see id. at
613-15. For a discussion of the recent increase of mercenary activity and the interna-
tional response, see W. BURCHETT & D. ROEBUCK, THE WHORES OF WAR: MERCE-
NARIES TODAY (1977).
20 Nicaragua filed the action on April 9, 1984. On November 26, 1984, the Inter-
national Court of Justice, over United States objections, held that it had jurisdiction
over the case. See Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary Activities In And
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Decision on Jurisdiction of Nov.
26). Although the United States withdrew from the World Court proceedings in early
1985, the court has retained its jurisdiction. See Statement On The U.S. Withdrawal
From The Proceedings Initiated By Nicaragua In The International Court Of Justice,
Jan. 18, 1985, reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 246 (1985). On June 27,
1986, the Court rendered a judgment against the United States, holding that the United
States had violated customary international law in aiding the contras. See Case Con-
cerning Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) (I.C.J. June 27, 1986) (Merits).
"I Both Lofgren and Reveley read the clause even more broadly, arguing that it
gives Congress the power to initiate all hostilities abroad short of declared war. See W.
REvELEY, supra note 7, at 63-64; Lofgren, supra note 7, at 699-700. Both authors
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operations against foreign governments is, therefore, constitutionally as-
signed to Congress. By giving the president free reign to initiate covert
paramilitary operations abroad, subject only to procedural oversight,
Congress has abdicated its constitutional responsibilities. When such
operations involve what amounts to full-scale war, the acquiescence of
Congress in unilateral executive actions is a derogation of its responsi-
bility pursuant to its power to declare war. Even if these covert opera-
tions using force constitute hostilities short of war, however, congres-
sional authority over the granting of letters of marque and reprisal
indicate a constitutional intent that such actions by private individuals
be approved by Congress.
Part I of this Article describes the historical development of letters
of marque and reprisal and explains why the Constitution should treat
modern covert warfare as it treated private wars in the eighteenth cen-
tury. Part II explores the historical, doctrinal, and policy rationales for
placing the power over privately conducted warfare in the hands of
Congress, and argues that the Framers' intent as well as important pol-
icy considerations dictate that a decision to engage in such operations
must be made by Congress, not the executive. Part III discusses recent
congressional efforts to gain oversight over covert operations and con-
cludes that Congress may not delegate its authority over paramilitary
operations to the executive. Unless they are read narrowly, recent stat-
utory reforms designed to obtain congressional oversight over covert op-
erations unconstitutionally delegate Congress's article I, section 8 au-
thority to the president.
I. THE COVERT ACTION OF TODAY IS THE MARQUE
AND REPRISAL OF YESTERDAY
A. Private Wars and Letters of Marque and Reprisal
In the middle ages, private wars flourished.22 Indeed, until the
thirteenth century, warfare was often conducted by individuals or
groups without any governmental control. 23 In the absence of strong
central governments to defend their interests, private individuals injured
by a foreign sovereign or its citizens commonly resorted to self-help in
view the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal as a restraint on the use of
United States troops abroad.
22 See E. CASTREN, THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY 12 (1954); 1
R. WARD, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATION AND HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN EUROPE 293-94 (1795); Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality
Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1983).
2" See A. HINDMARSH, supra note 6, at 44.
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order to avenge personal harms.24 Unrestricted private battles and
skirmishes led to incessant warfare. In one case, an English sailor
began a fight with a Norman seaman that touched off cross-retaliations
wholly independent of any governmental authority. The result was a
war in which two hundred Norman ships hunted down and hung all
the English seamen they could find. In turn, a stronger English fleet
destroyed most of the Norman ships and massacred 15,000 men. Fi-
nally, the respective governments got involved, and put an end to this
private war.26 Incidents like this made it apparent to all governments
that state control over the use of martial force was necessary. By the
sixteenth century, warfare conducted without governmental authoriza-
tion was outlawed by international law, and unrestrained use of force
by individuals was gradually replaced by a requirement that formal
sanction first be obtained from the sovereign.
28
The governmental license for the private use of force was termed a
letter of marque and reprisal.2  A letter of marque originally author-
24 See 2 J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 182
(T. Nugent trans. 1823) ("if the prince takes no notice or refuses satisfaction, we may
then take reprisals").
25 See R. WARD, supra note 22, at 177-78, 293-94; Maccoby, Reprisals as a
Measure of Redress Short of War, 2 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 60, 61 (1924). Apart from loss
of lives and the potential of involving nations in war, private warfare also severely
inhibited trade. See A. HINDMARSH, supra note 6, at 43-44; 1 P. JESSUP & F. DEAK,
NEUTRALITY, ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW: THE ORIGINS 12-13 (1935).
These incursions led merchants engaged in foreign trade to resort to self-help to protect
their property and persons. See A. HINDMARSH, supra note 6, at 43-44. As Chief
Justice Marshall noted in the case of The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815), the
practice of arming merchant vessels can "be traced back to the time when almost every
merchantman was in a condition for self-defense, and the implements of war were so
light and so cheap that scarcely any would sail without them." 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at
426.
28 See R. WARD, supra note 22, at 295-96.
27 See H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 316 (A. Campbell trans.
1901) (1st ed. 1625) (stating that the power to wage lawful war lies in the sovereign);
see also E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW 292 U. Chitty trans. 1839) (1st ed. 1758) (The right to wage war, "so dangerous
in its exercise, no longer remains with private parties . . . . [T]he sovereign power
alone is possessed of authority to make war . . ."); 2 C. WOU 'F, Jus GENTIUM
METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM § 613 U. Drake trans. 1934) (1st ed.
London 1749) (stating that the right of war belongs to nations).
28 See A. HINDMARSH, supra note 6, at 44; E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL
REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES 36-37 (1984); Clark, The English
Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 696
(1933). By requiring subjects to obtain authorization for hostile acts against another
country, the king or prince could thereby examine the justice and strength of their
claims as well as the political consequences of granting the request, while the subject,
by virtue of the authorization, was protected against the charge of piracy. See Maccoby,
supra note 25, at 61-62.
2" See Clark, supra note 28, at 700-02. An early mention of the term "letters of
marque" can be found in a 1293 proclamation of King Edward I of England. See id. at
[Vol. 134:1035 -
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ized the crossing of borders to obtain redress,"0 while a letter of reprisal
sanctioned the use of force to secure compensation for an unlawful tak-
ing of property or goods.31 When issued in tandem,"2 letters of marque
and reprisal authorized injured parties to seize property, or, in ex-
traordinary cases, foreign citizens" who had refused to provide redress
for an injury they had inflicted.
3 4
As governmental control over warfare increased in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, the terms "letters of marque," "letters of re-
prisal," and "letters of marque and reprisal" began to take on new
meanings, reflecting a gradual move away from "special" or "particu-
lar" letters, which authorized "particular persons" to seek recompense
for specific wrongs, to "general letters," which had the effect of "war,
700. It is possible that some letters of marque were issued as early as the twelfth
century. See Maccoby, supra note 25, at 60 n.1. By the fourteenth century, Italian
merchants who appealed to local authorities were able to obtain "litterae" or "chartae,"
which enabled them to seize the goods or property of foreign debtors, see A.
HINDMARSH, supra note 6, at 49, and medieval kings began to speak of granting letters
of mark and reprisal, see Maccoby, supra note 26, at 60 n.1.
S0 See Hooper v. U.S., 22 Ct. CI. 408, 429 (1887); A. HINDMARSH, supra note 6,
at 51; H. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC WAR 437 (1901). The
term marque appears to be derived from the Latin "marca," the Norman "marco," the
English "march," and the German "die Marken," all of which were associated with
the right to pass across borders. See Clark, supra note 28, at 700-01.
Si See A. HINDMARSH, supra note 6, at 44-45; Clark, supra note 28, at 702-03.
32 A letter of reprisal authorized the holder to make seizures only within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the sovereign. In order to obtain the broadest means of redress, an
injured party usually applied for both letters. Thus, in time, the practical distinction
between the two began to fade so that a single "letter of marque and reprisal" came to
be utilized. See A. HINDMARSH, supra note 6, at 51.
"' See H. GROTIUS, supra note 27, at 312; 2 C. WOLFF, supra note 27, at § 591-
595 (stating that "androlepsy is a certain sort of reprisal . . . that is allowable by the
law of nature among nations").
During the English war with Holland in the 1660's, King Charles II of England
authorized
general reprizall against the shipps goods and subjects of the States of the
United Provinces, soe that as well his Majestie'sfleet and shipps, as also
all other shipps and vessels that shalbe commissionated by letters of mar-
que or generall reprizalls . . . may lawfully seize and take all shipps,
vessels, and goods belonging to the States of the United Provinces, or anie
their subjects or inhabitants within anie the territories of the States of the
United Provinces.
Clark, supra note 28, at 721. This letter demonstrates that not only goods, but also
inhabitants of Holland were to be subject to general reprisals from private individuals
as well as the English navy.
34 See H. GROTIUS, supra note 27, at 312 ("[Rleprisals are made upon the per-
sons and property of the subjects, belonging to a power, who refuses to grant redress
and reparation for injuries and aggressions."); A. HINDMARSH, supra note 6, at 49
("The applicant was required to show that he had appealed in vain to the proper
tribunals abroad."). The procedure and requirements for obtaining such letters are de-
scribed in id. at 49-50.
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yet is not . . . regular war."35 The term "letters of marque" came to
refer to the authorization both of armed trading vessels to attack ships
of foreign nations during peace or war and of private vessels, outfitted
with armaments and called privateers, to fight in place of or alongside
public naval vessels. 6 The term "reprisals" came to refer to any utili-
zation of force with the sovereign's consent in retaliation for an injury
caused by the sovereign of another state or his subjects.3 7 Thus, by the
eighteenth century, letters of marque and reprisal referred primarily to
sovereign utilization of private forces, and sometimes public forces, to
injure another state.38 Indeed, by that time "special" letters of marque
and reprisal had fallen into disuse and "general" letters
predominated. 9
In seventeenth and eighteenth century America, private individuals
were commonly relied on to fight wars on land and sea. The French
and Indian War was fought for several years as an undeclared war and
depended on letters of marque and reprisal in addition to public naval
reprisals. 0  Letters of marque were issued during the American
Revolution,' 1 and privateering commissions were common in America
throughout the colonial period.42 Lacking a strong navy, the Framers
35 1 M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN, 162 (S. Emlyn ed. 1736) (1st ed. London 1680). Sir Matthew Hale,
an English writer well-known to the colonists, divided war into two kinds, special and
general. "[S]pecial kinds of war are that, which we usually call marque or reprisal."
Id. These he divided into two sub-categories. "Particular" letters were granted to
"some particular persons" to seek recompense for specific wrongs. General marque or
reprisal had the effect of a war, yet not a regular war. The difference was that during
wartime a person could not seize the goods of the adverse party absent a commission
from the crown, and that hostilities under a general marque were limited, not general.
See id.
3' See Instructions to the Collectors of Customs (Aug. 4, 1793), reprinted in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS 140 (W. Lowrie & M. Clarke eds.
1883) (distinction drawn by Alexander Hamilton between "vessels armed for merchan-
dise and war, . . . called. . . letters of marque," and privateers); F. GROB, supra note
4, at 238-39 (a privately owned, armed ship was usually called a "letter of marque" or
a "privateer," while an armed trading vessel was called a "letter of marque and repri-
sal"); H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 292 n.151 (G. Wilson ed.
1936) (1st ed. R. Dana 1866) ("[T]he term 'letter of marque' seems to be confined to
the authorization to private armed trading vessels to make captures of property on the
enemy in war.").
37 See 2 J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 24, at 180; E. ZOLLER, supra note 28, at
37-38; Lofgren, supra note 7, at 693.
;! See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.
39 See F. GROB, supra note 4, at 238-39.
40 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1811 (1798) (Fifth Cong., 2d Sess.)
41 See, e.g., ACTS AND RESOLVES OF RHODE ISLAND 5 (1776); see also Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to S. Huntington (Oct. 16, 1779), reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 107 (J. Boyd ed. 1951) (requesting blank letters of marque).
42 See J. JAMESON, PRIVATEERING AND PIRACY IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD: IL-
LUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS viii (1923); see, e.g., Commission of Capt. Benjamin Norton
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recognized that the United States had to continue to resort to private
armed ships to conduct hostilities at sea,4 and thus provided for the
issuance of letters of marque and reprisal in both the Articles of Con-
federation44 and the United States Constitution.45 Letters of marque
were issued in the quasi-war with France' and in the War of 1812.
Although the federal government has not issued letters of marque since
the War of 1812, the Confederacy relied on them extensively through-
out the Civil War. 8
In eighteenth century America, the term "letters of marque and
reprisal" lost much of its technical meaning and came to signify any
intermediate or low-intensity hostility short of declared war that uti-
lized public or private forces, although the emphasis on the use of pri-
vate forces remained. The term was used interchangeably with the
terms reprisal, privateer, and commission, each of which had a some-
what different technical meaning.
49
as a Privateer (June 2, 1741), reprinted in id. at 378-81.
43 See, e.g., 7 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 547-48 (1906)
(quoting from a paper by Thomas Jefferson advocating privateering).
44 See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION arts. VI and IX.
45 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
46 See infra text accompanying notes 117-43.
47 See F. GROB, supra note 4, at 239.
4S Id.
49 For example, both Madison and Gerry spoke of the power to grant "letters of
marque," although technically such letters may have had a different meaning than the
term "letters of marque and reprisal" or commissions to privateers. See 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1797, at 326 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
[hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS]; THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 269 (J.
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); id. No. 44, at 299 (J. Madison). "Letters of marque"
were not generally thought to refer to the authorization of privateers. See Instructions
to the Collectors of Customs, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 36,
at 140. Some writers differentiated letters of marque from letters of marque and repri-
sal on the basis of whether they were issued during times of war (marque) or times of
peace (marque and reprisal). See, e.g., H. WHEATON, supra note 36, at § 292 n.151.
Treaties entered into during this period did not address letters of marque, but outlawed
the issuance of "any commission to any private armed vessels." See, e.g., Draft of A
Model Treaty, art. 23 (Nov. 10, 1784), reprinted in 7 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON, supra note 41, at 486.
Nor was a sharp division drawn between special letters of marque and reprisal
and general reprisals. Many writers did not draw any distinction at all. See, e.g., I W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 250-51 (1765). Others
referred to special letters as well as general reprisals as "imperfect wars." See, e.g., J.
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 71 (Holmes ed. 1873) (1st ed. 1826).
Others who referred to "special" or "qualified" letters referred neither to the extent of
the operations authorized nor to the existence of particular injuries to specific persons.
See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (Mar. 1797), reprinted
in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 574 (H. Syrett ed. 1974) (Congress
should "[g]rant Qualified letters of marck to . ..Merchantmen to . ..defend them-
selves."); 8 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 40, at 1803 (remarks of Rep. Sitgreaves)
(Authorization given to merchant ships to attack French cruisers is "not a course of
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When the Framers of the Articles of Confederation and the Con-
stitution spoke of the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal,
they referred to the power to authorize a broad spectrum of armed hos-
tilities short of declared war.50 For example, Thomas Jefferson in-
cluded within the congressional power to issue letters of marque and
reprisal the power to order general reprisals against a foreign nation
using the public armed forces.5 1 Similarly, James McHenry, John Ad-
ams' Secretary of War, and Alexander Hamilton, a former Secretary of
the Treasury, agreed that any executive exercise of American naval
force beyond defending the nation's seacoast, American vessels, or com-
merce within American waters "come[s] within the sphere of reprisals
and ... require[s] the explicit sanction of the branch of government
which is alone constitutionally authorised to grant letters of marque
and reprisal."52 More generally, many statesmen of the period used
marque and reprisal to refer to a state of "imperfect war," 5' by which
they meant any state of armed hostilities that did not rise to the level of
delared war.5" Since the Framers and other early statesmen did not
adhere to the technical definition of such letters when they discussed
them in the early years of the republic, it can be argued that in general,
uses of force short of war, such as modern-day covert paramilitary war-
general reprisal, but of special reprisal," because of its defensive nature.).
50 See infra notes 253-60 and accompanying text (statements by Framers and
early statesmen categorizing the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal as a species
of "imperfect war").
51 Jefferson noted that the "making of a reprisal on a nation was a serious thing
[often leading to war, therefore,] the right of reprisal [is] expressly lodged with [Con-
gress] by the Constitution and not with the Executive." Op. Sec'y of State (May 16,
1793) (Thomas Jefferson), reprinted in 7 J. MOORE, supra note 43, at 123 (emphasis
added).
52 Letter from James McHenry to John Adams (May 18, 1798), reprinted in A.
SOFAER, supra note 5, at 155. Hamilton had advised McHenry that the president's
constitutional power went no further than the authority "to repel force by force ....
Any thing beyond this must fall under the idea of reprisals and requires the sanction of
that Department which is to declare or make war." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to
James McHenry (May 17, 1798), reprinted in 21 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAM-
ILTON, supra note 49, at 461-62. Hamilton reiterated that the power to authorize any
reprisals was a congressional power when he noted that the effect of the 1795 Jay
Treaty with England was "to restrain the power and discretion of Congress to grant
reprisals till there has been an unsuccessful demand for Justice." The Defence No.
XXXVII, reprinted in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 49, at
17 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
53 See J. KENT, supra note 49, at 71.
See 8 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 40, at 1511 (statement of Rep. Gallatin)
(arguing that the grant of letters of marque generally preceded war, "when it has not
been thought proper to come to open warfare at once"); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 218-19 (Boston 1833) (describing the
grant of letters of marque and reprisals as a "hostile measure for unredressed griev-
ances . . . most generally the precursor of an appeal to arms by general hostilities").
[Vol. 134:1035
COVERT WAR
fare, comes within the sphere of the Framers' concern.
B. Covert Operations and the Re-emergence of Private War
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a dramatic
reduction in the use of private forces to achieve national aims. With the
increasing centralization of the state apparatus in western Europe and
the United States, nations turned to public armies and navies to achieve
their military goals. 55 In 1856, the nations of Europe signed the Decla-
ration of Paris, which declared privateering to be unlawful.5" By the
middle 1800's, the laws of war no longer permitted governments to au-
thorize "guerrilla parties, self-constituted sets of armed men . ..who
form no integral part of the organized army. '57 In recent times, how-
ever, private armies have re-emerged as important military instruments
in the international arena.58
There are several reasons for the renewed emphasis on private
warfare. The diminution of private warfare in the nineteenth century
was a response to the rise of a strong, centralized state power; its
reemergence can be attributed to the coexisting centrifugal and centrip-
etal forces affecting national governments today. Since World War II,
civil war-particularly in third world nations with weak central gov-
ernments-has replaced war between nations as the principal form of
armed conflict.59 Civil warfare invariably involves nonstate actors and
65 See M. ANDERSON, EUROPE IN THE 18TH CENTURY 1713-83, 142, 151
(1961); F. GROB, supra note 4, at 238; D. PENNINGTON, 17TH CENTURY EUROPE
236-37 (1970).
58 7 See J. MOORE, supra note 43, at 561-62.
57 See F. LIEBER, GUERRILLA PARTIES CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE
LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR 18-19 (New York 1862).
58 See supra note 9.
59 See Luard, Civil Conflicts in Modern International Relations, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS 7-8 (E. Luard ed. 1972). Between 1945 and
1972 there were at least 30 significant civil wars, not including sporadic disturbances,
unorganized guerrilla activity, and cases of coup d'etat. See id. at 7, 13. Between 1946
and 1959, over 1200 internal disturbances broke out that could be considered war. See
Eckstein, Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War, in INTERNAL WAR:
PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES 3 (H. Eckstein ed. 1964). Internal hostilities are respon-
sible for 80% of all victims of armed conflicts since 1945. See Forsythe, Legal Manage-
ment of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International Conflicts, 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 272 (1978).
The incidence of civil war appears to be increasing. While there were 23 ongoing
prolonged insurgent movements worldwide in 1958, by 1966 there were 40. See R.
MCNAMARA, THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY 145 (1968). Thus, civil war has replaced
war between nations as the principal form of warfare in the twentieth century. See
Firmage, International Law and the Response of the United States to 'Internal War',
in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 103 (R. Falk ed. 1969);
Franck & Rodley, Legitimacy and Legal Rights of Revolutionary Movements with Spe-
cial Reference to the People's Revolutionary Government of South Viet Nam, in 3 THE
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may even degenerate into a multiplicity of private armies operating in-
stead of, or alongside, the national military, as it has in Lebanon and
El Salvador.60 This breakdown of governmental authority at the pe-
riphery has been matched by a tremendous expansion of national mili-
tary power at the center. The old nineteenth century balance of power
has been reformed and consolidated into two competing blocs that seek
to avoid direct military conflict with each other."1 Furthermore, the de-
velopment of nuclear weapons has led the major powers to avoid direct
armed confrontation, and to struggle for supremacy instead through
proxy wars fought between different factions within the borders of a
third nation.6 2 The vast destructive might of the modern industrialized
superpowers has thus converged with the weakness of the governmental
apparatus of developing nations so that warfare between nations is ex-
ercised primarily through involvement by external powers in internal
civil wars.
The United States has often been one of the external powers in-
volved in internal civil wars. Not only have American troops directly
participated in foreign civil wars, as in Korea and Vietnam,"8 but the
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 723, 724; King, Revolu-
tionary War, Guerrilla Warfare and International Law, 4 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
91, 101 (1972). Intervention by the major powers has internationalized many of these
internal conflicts. See Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal
War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 218-19 (J. Rosenau ed. 1964);
Kaplan, Intervention in Internal War: Some Systemic Sources, in id., at 92.
60 The recent civil strife in the Philippines during the last days of the Marcos
regime provides an illustration of the development of private armies. To protect them-
selves against the leftist insurgency, close associates of President Ferdinand Marcos
assembled large private armies that had thousands of members trained in special war-
fare tactics. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, at Al, col. 1. Such armies can become an
important power base, threatening to supplant the existing state apparatus. See id. For
the development of paramilitary organizations in Central American civil wars, see
Flynn, Central America, The Roots of Revolt, in THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION 29,
42-43 (R. Burbach & P. Flynn eds. 1984).
1 See A. JORDAN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 29-32 (discussing constraints
on open use of force in the modern world).
62 According to Richard Falk,
Violent encounter of major rivals in world affairs has always been primar-
ily a matter of warfare between states; now suddenly it is participation in
warfare within states. . . . [Wiarfare between states now most frequently
takes place within a single national society. . . . Significant multinational
participation transforms an internal war into a species of international
war.
Falk, Janus Tormented, supra note 59, at 185, 218. Similarly, Luard has noted that
"more than ever, the struggle between nations . . . [is] undertaken through local polit-
ical movements and rebellions." Luard, supra note 59, at 9.
6s See, e.g., J. GOULDEN, KOREA: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WAR (1982)
(detailing the history of United States intervention in Korea in the 1940's and 1950's);
Lacouture, From Vietnam War to Indochina War, in 3 THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 9-32 (discussing United States military in-
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United States has also become involved in internal civil war through
the use of private paramilitary forces working under the direction of
officers or employees of the CIA."' The use of paramilitary forces is
designed to carry out United States foreign policy without "the role of
the U.S. government [being] discernable.1 65 Paramilitary forces are
only one aspect of the CIA's covert action program, which includes all
international activities other than pure intelligence gathering.
Covert operations cover a wide range of activities in foreign coun-
tries and can include political advice to foreign persons or organiza-
tions, financial support and assistance to foreign political parties, 6 cov-
ert propaganda, and the direction of paramilitary operations designed
to overthrow or support a foreign regime.67 Although covert political
and economic operations often violate the international norm against
intervention in the internal affairs of other nations,"' they are beyond
the scope of the marque and reprisal clause, which can only be read to
apply to actual uses of military force against foreign nations. Moreover,
covert warfare is generally a far more serious threat to both the foreign
country's security and world peace than other covert interferences in
internal affairs.6 9
volvement in spreading the Vietnam War into Cambodia and Laos).
" For discussions of CIA covert operations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America,
see S. KUMAR, CIA AND THE THIRD WORLD (1981); V. MARCHETTI & J. MARKS,
THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE 113-25 (1974). For a history of the CIA's
organization of the Bay of Pigs operation, see P. WYDEN, BAY OF PIGS: THE UNTOLD
STORY (1979).
85 CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, COMPARISON OF PROPOSALS
FOR REFORMING THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, reprinted in National Intelligence
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2525 Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1978); see also S. REP. No.
755, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 131 (1977) [hereinafter Church Committee Report] (defin-
ing covert action as clandestine activity designed to influence foreign governments,
events, organizations or persons in such a way that the involvement of the United States
government is not apparent).
88 See e.g., R. CLINE, THE CIA UNDER REAGAN, BUSH & CASEY 122-24
(describing CIA's role in providing aid and assistance to the Italian Christian
Democrats).
67 See, e.g., V. MARCHETTI & J. MARKS, supra note 64, at app. 387 (speech of
Richard J. Bissell, Jr., before the Council on Foreign Relations' Discussion Group on
Intelligence and Foreign Policy, Jan. 8, 1968).
68 See Falk, CIA Covert Operations and International Law, in R. BOROSAGE &
J. MARKS, THE CIA FILE 147 (1976).
89 See Sohn, Gradations of Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 225, 227 (1983) (distinguishing sending armies across boundaries from other,
more minor forms of intervention). The distinction between intervention in an internal
conflict and aggression across national borders has been criticized and is becoming in-
creasingly blurred. See Hoffmann, International Law and Control of Force, in THE
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-46 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1968);
Reisman, supra note 8, at 258. However, the maintenance of this distinction is vital to
world peace and security. See Falk, Janus Tormented, supra note 59, at 221 n.55. It
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The use of paramilitary troops to overthrow or support foreign
regimes, which the United States government first relied upon heavily
in the 19501S,70 has been an important element of the American covert
action program throughout the post-war period. In the late 1940's the
CIA organized guerrilla operations against several eastern European
countries,71 and between 1953 and 1973 the CIA used paramilitary
troops in at least eight major efforts against foreign governments. 72 Be-
cause of the post-Vietnam political and legal objections to using Ameri-
can troops to achieve foreign policy goals,73 presidents have turned
more and more to paramilitary operations to execute foreign policy.
Under the Reagan administration covert support of major paramilitary
actions has played a central role in carrying out United States foreign
policy, 4 as is evident in our relations with Nicaragua, Afghanistan,
Cambodia, and other countries.7 5 The Reagan administration has re-
cently adopted a broad policy, urged by the Heritage Foundation 76 and
would be a grave error to conflate the different, albeit related, concepts of aggression
and intervention.
70 See Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 143; R. Grummet, Reported
Foreign and Domestic Covert Activities of the United States Central Intelligence
Agency 1950-1974, reprinted in THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, supra note 14, at
695-706. Covert action was not explicitly authorized in the legislation that established
the CIA. See National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-412 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980); see also Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 476-92 (discussing the
question of whether the 1947 statute intended to authorize covert action). The act did
authorize the performance of "functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." 50
U.S.C. § 403(d)(5) (1976). By 1953 there were sizeable covert operations in 48 coun-
tries. See Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 145.
71 See Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 145. Paramilitary operations
grew throughout the 1950's, reaching their peak in the mid and late 1960's. See id. at
148.
72 See Falk, CIA, Covert Action and International Law, SOCIETY, Mar.-Apr.
1975, at 39, 40-41.
" These objections led to the enactment of the War Powers Resolution, which
limits executive use of United States troops. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982). The
constitutional validity of the Act's concurrent resolution provision, which enables Con-
gress to terminate a presidential military deployment at any time, is in question because
of its resemblance to the legislative veto declared unconstitutional in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). For a discussion of the
current status of this section of the Act, see Note, Congressional Control of Presiden-
tial Warmaking Under the War Powers Act: The Status of a Legislative Veto After
Chadha, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1217 (1984).
71 See Stone, The Special Forces in Covert Action, THE NATION, July 7-14,
1984, at 8; Rubin, G.O.P., Party of International Revolution, N.Y. Times, May 26,
1985, at E15, col. 1.
75 See supra note 9.
71 See U.S. Aid to Rebels in Nine Countries Suggested by Conservative Group,
N.Y. Times, November 20, 1984, at A5, col. 3 (prediction by Richard V. Allen, Presi-
dent Reagan's former national security advisor and now a fellow at the Heritage Foun-
dation, that the report "will have a very significant impact" on the Reagan administra-
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other conservatives, of underwriting anti-Communist insurgency, in-
cluding the use of paramilitary forces to overthrow the governments of
nine countries that "threaten United States interests."
7 7
This covert use of paramilitary force to conduct American foreign
policy abroad is the modern day analogy to the private wars for which
letters of marque and reprisal were historically required. Both involve
the use of private individuals rather than public armed forces to engage
in hostilities against other nations. Both are primarily utilized when
war has not been formally declared. Both are often precursors to full-
scale war.78 The central difference between the two is that while the
private wars of earlier times were fought by American private citizens
authorized by the American government, modern-day covert warfare is
fought primarily by non-American private citizens under the direction
of American CIA officers. Furthermore, these private citizens are not
necessarily acting intentionally on behalf of the United States, but in-
stead are being aided by the United States in the achievement of their
own ends. These distinctions are not problematic for two reasons. First,
while covert operations often involve foreign citizens, letters of marque
were occasionally given to foreign nationals as well as Americans.7 9
Second, regardless of their personal or national aims, the actions taken
by foreign nationals acting in concert with CIA officers and with
American military aid are often legally attributable to the United
tion); see also Shultz, Low-Intensity Conflict, in MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP II 268
(S. Butler, M. Sanera, W. Weinrod eds. 1984). Included on the Heritage Foundation's
list of countries where the United States should "employ paramilitary assets" are Cam-
bodia, Laos, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Iran, and Libya. See
id.
7 See Klare, Low Intensity Conflict: The New U.S. Strategic Doctrine, THE NA-
TION, Dec. 28, 1985-Jan. 4, 1986, at 697; Shultz, New Realities and New Ways of
Thinking, 63 FOREIGN AFE. 705, 712-13 (1985).
78 See 131 CONG. REc. H4134 (daily ed. June 12, 1985) (statement of Rep. Wil-
liams) (providing aid to the contras in Nicaragua is likely to lead to full-scale American
involvement in Central American warfare); S. REP. No. 220, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 27
(1973) (covert paramilitary action in Vietnam was first step in escalating ground com-
bat involvement of the United States); see also infra text accompanying notes 255-60
(statements of Framers and early nineteenth century statesmen that privateering and
other private hostilities almost inevitably lead to war).
79 For example, during the Civil War, foreigners applied to the Confederate states
for letters of marque and reprisal and were referred to commissioners in Europe. See
W. ROBINSON, THE CONFEDERATE PRIVATEERS 239 (1928). Baltimore served as a
port for the issuance of French privateering commissions during the 1790's and again
for commissions for Latin American revolutionaries in the 1800's. See J. GARITEE,
THE REPUBLIC'S PRIVATE NAVY 27-28, 224-28 (1977). Vattel, while disapproving of
a nation issuing letters of marque to foreigners, noted that the English had done so. See
E. DE VATTEL, supra note 27, at 285. James Kent noted that privateers "are some-
times manned and officered by foreigners, having no permanent connection with the
country, or interest in its cause." I J. KENT, supra note 49, at 107.
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States.
Under international law the United States can be held liable for
the actions of its paramilitary operatives as if it had directly authorized
their activities.8" In an effort to ensure that national governments are
answerable for any actions they take in the international arena, modern
international law holds them liable for all actions for which they are
functionally, not just formally, responsible."' Similarly, letters of mar-
que and reprisal were developed in response to the increasing need for
state responsibility and control over warfare. The requirement that pri-
vate parties obtain a letter of marque and reprisal was developed pre-
cisely to limit hostile acts that might plunge the nation into war. 2 State
authorization was the mechanism by which early modern governments
sought to ensure state responsibility and control over the actions of pri-
vate citizens.
Today armed hostilities abroad conducted by paramilitary groups
with our support and under our direction make us vulnerable both to
retaliations from other nations and liability under international law.
They thus raise the same concerns of United States responsibility that
motivated the Framers to require congressional authorization pursuant
to the marque and reprisal clause. As James Madison noted in the
Federalist Papers, the constitutional requirement that only Congress
grant letters of marque was designed to ensure "immediate responsibil-
ity to the nation in all those for whose conduct that nation itself is to be
responsible." 3 Where international law treats American support of
paramilitary operations as functionally equivalent to the use of force
against a foreign state by the United States, authorization of such
paramilitary action is within the exclusive domain of Congress, which
alone is capable of granting letters of marque and reprisal. 4
80 See infra text accompanying notes 85-91.
"I See id.
8' During the congressional debates concerning whether letters of marque and re-
prisal should be issued during the quasi-war with France, see infra text accompanying
notes 117-43, several congressmen were worried about United States liability for the
actions of armed merchants, see 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 272 (1797) (Fifth Cong., 1st
Sess.) (remarks of Rep. Nicholas) (if the Congress "authorized a practice which pro-
duced evil, it would be the same as if they authorized the evil"), while others recog-
nized the need for strong congressional restrictions on the arming of private
merchantmen to avoid possible abuses and resulting United States liability, see id. at
262-63 (remarks of Rep. Harper) (abuses were far easier and more dangerous at sea
than on land and therefore stronger restrictions were necessary).
83 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 49, at 318 (B. Wright ed. 1.961).
s There is thus a relationship between international law and constitutional re-
quirements. See Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 33 (stating that the fed-
eral government has the constitutional authority to undertake foreign intelligence activ-
ity in accordance with applicable norms of international law); see also Nielson v.
Secretary of Treasury, 424 F.2d 833, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (whether a United States
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International law holds nations liable in-connection with the activ-
ities of private armies in several situations. First, if private individuals
are hired, directed, or directly controlled by United States officials, in-
ternational law treats them as United States agents and their action
will be attributable to the United States.85 Second, article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter and customary international law prohibit ag-
gression against other nations, including sending out, or substantial
participation in the use of, armed bands, mercenaries, or irregulars that
commit substantial acts of armed force against another nation.86 In re-
sponse to the development of indirect or covert warfare to circumvent
the Charter's prohibition on aggression, the General Assembly, with
strong American support, adopted rules prohibiting "indirect aggres-
sion." These rules proscribe sending armed bands "by or on behalf of a
State" and "substantial involvement" in the acts of armed groups.8"
foreign policy measure amounts to a taking must "take into account prevailing concepts
of international law").
" See, for example, the opinion of the International Court of Justice, Military
And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (I.C.J. June
27, 1986) (Merits).
"See G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974); see also supra note 18. Many commentators have agreed that the definition of
aggression should include the use of and reliance on private parties to engage in war-
fare. Judge Roberto Ago, former Special Rapporteur for the Third Report on State
Responsibility to the International Law Commission, explained that international law
will attribute responsibility to a national government for the acts of private individuals
where "private persons may be secretly appointed to carry out particular missions or
tasks to which the organs of the State prefer not to assign regular State officials; people
may be sent as so-called 'volunteers' to help an insurrectional movement in a neighbor-
ing country-and many more examples could be given." Third Report on State Re-
sponsibility, [1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 199, 263, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/246 &
Add. 1-3. Brownlie supports the view that "a co-ordinated and general campaign by
powerful bands of irregulars, with obvious or easily proven complicity of the govern-
ment of a state from which they operate, would constitute an 'armed attack.'" I.
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 279 (1963);
see also id. at 361 (stating that armed force could mean giving "aid to groups of insur-
gents on the territory of another state").
The World Court has recently ruled that the definition of aggression in General
Assembly Resolution 3314 "may be taken to reflect customary international law." Mil-
itary and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicarargua § 195 (Nicar. v. U.S.)
(I.C.J. June 27, 1986) (Merits); see also id. at §§ 154-171 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Schwebel, the American judge) (concluding that the sending out or substantial
participation in the acts of an armed band is aggression under customary international
law).
17 This formulation represented a compromise position between the western na-
tions, led by the United States, and several third world countries. The American view
was that a prohibition limited to "sending" armed groups was too narrow. See 2 B.
FERENCZ, supra note 18, at 39. An earlier western draft would have condemned
"[o]rganizing, supporting or directing armed bands or irregular or volunteer forces that
make incursions or infiltrate into another State." Report of the Special Committee on
the Question of Defining Aggression, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 60, U.N. Doc.
A/8019 (1970). Similarly, in 1972 the United States proposed adding the following list
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Third, as the World Court has recently recognized in the case in-
volving Nicaragua and the United States, a nation will be found to
have engaged in the use of force against another nation by "organizing
or encouraging the organization of irregular forces . . . for incursion
into the territory of another State," or "participating in acts of civil
strife . . . in another State," when such acts of civil strife involve
armed force.8" Arming and training private armies appears to meet this
of examples to article 3(g) of the definition of aggression:
The organizing by a State, or encouragement of the organization of, or
assistance to, irregular forces or armed bands or other groups, volunteers,
or mercenaries, which participate in incursions into another State's terri-
tory or in the carrying out of acts involving the use of force in or against
another State, or knowing acquiescence in organized activities within its
own territory directed toward and resulting in the commission of such acts.
28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 22-23, U.N. Doc. A/9019 (1973).
Many nations of the third world, in contrast, objected to such an expansive prohi-
bition on aid to armed bands. They sought to limit the article 3(g) definition of aggres-
sion to the actual sending of armed groups against another state. See Report of the
Sixth Committee, 28 U.N. GAOR C.6 at 11, U.N. Doc. A/9411 (1973); 2 B. FER-
ENCZ, supra note 18, at 39-40. These nations feared that if article 3(g) was read too
broadly it might condemn assistance to indigenous groups engaged in struggles for self-
determination against colonial powers and allow strong nations an easy pretext to jus-
tify the use of force against weaker ones under a claim of collective self-defense. See id.;
J. STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENsus 81-82 (1977).
The final language of article 3(g) emerged as a compromise between these two
positions. See 2 B. FERENCZ, supra note 18, at 40; J. STONE, supra, at 75. The defini-
tion starts by condemning the "sending" of armed groups. The United States language
condemning "organizing, supporting, or directing" armed groups was dropped. Instead,
the prohibition was extended to "substantial involvement" in the activities of the armed
groups. See 2 B. FERENCZ, supra note 18, at 40.
The United States has been a consistent and forceful advocate for the development
of international law rules prohibiting indirect aggression. For example, as early as
1947 United States Representative Austin stated to the Security Council that "Yugosla-
via, Bulgaria and Albania, in supporting guerrillas in northern Greece, have been using
force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece. They have
in fact been committing acts of the very kind which the United Nations was designed to
prevent . . . ." 2 U.N. SCOR (147th mtg.) at 1120-1121 (1947). International Court
of Justice Judge Stephen Schwebel, then United States Representative to the Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, argued in 1972 that the U.N.
Charter makes no distinction between direct and indirect uses of force and that the
"most pervasive forms of modern aggression tend to be indirect ones." Schwebel, Ag-
gression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern International Law, 136 RECUEIL
DES COURS, 1972, II, at 411, 458. "'The characteristic of indirect aggression appears
to be that the aggressor State, without itself committing hostile acts as a State, operates
through third parties who are either foreigners or nationals seemingly acting on their
own initiative.'" Id. at 455-56 (quoting Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc.
A/2211, at 72).
" Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua § 228 (Nicar.
v. U.S.) (I.C.J. June 27, 1986) (Merits); see also id. at §§ 191-238, 247, 292(4). The
Declaration of Principle of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, art. 1,
para. 9, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, 123, U.N. Doc. A/
8028 (1970), includes the following activities in connection with armed bands under the
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standard although the mere supply of funds to such groups generally
would not. 9 Violation of this principle does not rise to the level of an
armed attack on the other state, and therefore the test is easier to meet:
requiring not "sending out" or "substantial participation" but merely
"organizing or encouraging the organization" or "participating" in the
acts of armed private groups that commit acts of force against another
State. Finally, nations must prohibit the organization or initiation of
hostile military expeditions against a foreign state by persons within its
territory. Where the appropriate diligence is not exercised, the govern-
ment will be held internationally responsible for any damage that
results.90
All of these legal foundations for State liability for the utilization
of private forces raise the core concern behind the letter of marque and
reprisal clause. All involve (i) United States responsibility under inter-
national law for (ii a use of force against another country (iii) arising
out of the actions of private forces. Where the connection between the
armed bands and the United States is extremely close and leads to an
agency relationship, as for example occurs in the first two situations set
forth above, the analogy to letters of marque and reprisal is particularly
principle barring the use of force between states:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging
the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including merce-
naries, for incursion into the territory of another State.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, as-
sisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed to-
wards the commission of such acts, when [such acts] involve a threat or
use of force.
89 Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua § 228 (Nicar.
v. U.S.) (I.C.J. June 27, 1986) (Merits).
90 See E. CASTREN, supra note 22, at 442; M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 18, at
49-53, 61-66; 3 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND AP-
PLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 2253-54 (2d ed. 1945); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, DisPuTEs, WAR AND NEUTRALITY § 332 (7th ed. 1952); Note, Nonen-
forcement of the Neutrality Act: International Law and Foreign Policy Powers Under
the Constitution, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1955, 1957-60 (1982); 3 A DIGEST OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 618, 630 (F. Wharton ed. 1886). The
United States was a forceful advocate for the incorporation of such a rule into interna-
tional law in the 19th century, see C. FENWICH, THE NEUTRALITY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES 6 (1913); Lobel, supra note 22, at 19-20, and it was largely due to
American efforts that this principle was incorporated into international law, see 1
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY OF
WASHINGTON 11, 14, 47-88 (1872). In 1872 the United States succeeded in establish-
ing British liability for actions in violation of this principle during the Civil War. See 4
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY OF
WASHINGTON 49-54 (1873); see also Declaration of Principle of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, supra note 88 (State's
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission
of civil strife in another States is unlawful use of force).
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strong. Even when a direct agency relationship does not exist, if United
States actions in support of armed bands are treated as a United States
use of force under international law, as under the third and fourth
standards of liability set forth above, the letter of marque and reprisal
clause is implicated. That clause was clearly concerned with United
States responsibility for private actions using armed force. The dividing
line is therefore between covert actions that are treated as a United
States use of force against another State and covert actions that are
merely treated as intervention, albeit often unlawful intervention, in the
internal affairs of a foreign State.
Any significant covert paramilitary expedition is likely to meet at
least one of these standards. Many recent covert paramilitary opera-
tions involve either United States or foreign nationals hired or directly
controlled by the CIA who participate in acts of violence against a for-
eign state.91 The actions of such agents will be directly attributable to
the United States under the first standard above. Similarly, in the CIA-
backed covert paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Guate-
mala, the United States either sent out, substantially participated in, or
helped organize acts of force committed by armed bands against a for-
eign government, for which it is liable under the General Assembly's
standard. 2 In general, whenever the United States provides extensive
91 Recently, the World Court found that while the Nicaraguan contras as a whole
could not be said to be mere agents of the United States, certain activities undertaken
by non-Nicaraguan Latin American nationals (referred to by the CIA as "Unilaterally
Controlled Latino Assets" (UCLA's)) concerning the planning, direction, and support
of United States nationals were directly attributable to the United States. See Military
and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua § 86 (I.C.J. June 27, 1986)
(Merits). Moreover, the World Court's decision came prior to the recent passage of
$100 million in aid for the contras, and the announcement that the administration had
given the CIA "day-to-day responsibility for managing rebels' military operations
against the Nicaraguan Government." N.Y. Times, July 12, 1986, at Al. Similarly in
China during 1951-1954, Indonesia in 1958, the Tibetan operation of 1958-1961, the
Laotian operation of 1960-1973, the Congo in 1964, the CIA's Vietnam actions even
prior to 1964, and Cuba in 1961, CIA agents participated in bombing runs or other
missions and directed or controlled the activities of the foreign paramilitary group. See
Wise, Covert Operations Abroad: An Overview, in THE CIA FILE, supra note 68, at
3, 20-24 (listing cases of CIA covert operations demonstrating either direct United
States control or direct participation by United States agents); V. MARCHETTI & J.
MARKS, supra note 64; Grummet, Foreign and Domestic Covert Activities of the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, reprinted in THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, supra
note 14, at 695.
" See Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua § 86
(I.C.J. June 27, 1986) (Merits); D. WISE & T. Ross, THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT
165-84 (1964) (discussing "CIA's coup" in 1954 against the Guatemalan government);
P. WYDEN, supra note 64, at 9-65 (stating that the Bay of Pigs operation was con-
trolled by the CIA); see also affidavit of Edgar Chamorro filed with the International
Court of Justice, Sept. 5, 1985, at 5 (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review) (stating that the CIA organized and now directs contras attacking Nicaragua)
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support to paramilitary groups in the form of arms, advisors, training,
or logistical support, it should be held to be substantially involved, or at
least participating, in the acts of the groups it is aiding.9" Such activi-
ties, therefore, must be approved by Congress pursuant to the marque
and reprisal clause.
Congress must authorize, pursuant to the marque and reprisal
clause, the use of armed bands to achieve American foreign policy goals
[hereinafter Chamorro affadavit].
The World Court's decision in Nicaragua v. United States leaves somewhat un-
clear the exact difference between the second and third standards mentioned in the text
discussing the United Nations's definition of aggression involving an armed attack com-
pared to the somewhat less serious unlawful use of force. See text accompanying notes
88-90. What is clear is as follows: (1) mere monetary aid to insurgents will not nor-
mally be considered an unlawful use of force under either standard, but will at most be
considered unlawful intervention; (2) arming and training guerrillas will meet the third
standard of the unlawful use of force against another country; and (3) the provision of
arms or logistical or other support to guerrillas, standing alone, does not meet the sec-
ond and highest standard of aggression involving an armed attack on another country.
What remains unclear is what acts of a state will meet the United Nation standard
of aggression involving an armed attack. That standard prohibits both the sending out
and substantial participation in activities of armed bands activities against another
state. While correctly finding against the United States claim that Nicaragua's provi-
sion of arms to El Salvador rebels constituted an armed attack, the court did not ad-
dress Nicaragua's claim that the United States was "substantially participating" in the
activities of the contras. The court instead rested its finding on the United States "par-
ticipation" in acts of force involving the provision of arms and training. The court did
find that the "contra force has, at least at one period, been so dependent on the United
States that it could not conduct its crucial or most significant military or paramilitary
activities without the multi-faceted support of the United States," a finding the court
termed "fundamental in the present case." Military and Paramilitary Activities In And
Against Nicaragua § 111 (I.C.J. June 27, 1986) (Merits). One would think that such a
finding would give rise not only to "participation" for the purposes of determining an
unlawful use of force but also "substantial participation" in the contras' activities under
the United Nations definition of aggression. In the absence of more guidance from the
court on this issue, it would seem difficult to ascertain what would constitute substan-
tial participation. While the court is correct that the supply of weapons and other logis-
tical support ought not to meet that standard, certainly substantial control and direction
over the insurgents' actions ought to. In any event, virtually all CIA paramilitary oper-
ations would appear to meet the court's standard requiring participation in the activi-
ties of armed bands. That standard was accepted by the United States, whose only
difference with the court was that it wanted to treat such participation not only as a
possible unlawful use of force but also as an armed attack and aggression giving rise to
a right of collective self-defense.
" Most CIA paramilitary covert actions involve either direct control, or substan-
tial support activity often secretly involving United States military forces. See Wise,
supra note 91, at 3, 20-24 (listing inter alia CIA paramilitary operations demonstrat-
ing either substantial United States participation or control in addition to simply pro-
viding money); see also V. MARCHETTI & J. MARKS, supra note 64, at 27-30, 114-21;
Grummet, supra note 91, at 695. For example, the overthrow of Premier Mohammed
Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, the support of Indonesian rebels in 1958, the Tibetan
operation of 1958-1961, and the Laotian operation during 1960-1973 all involved ei-
ther the CIA organizing and directing the activity or both extensive financial aid and
direct military actions such as the use of American planes in support of the activities.
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before the executive may use this method. These paramilitary forces
perform the same function that privateers and armed trading vessels did
two hundred years ago: they represent United States interests in armed
conflicts short of declared war against other sovereign nations.
Although some of the attributes of modern-day paramilitarism do
not fit the eighteenth century paradigm exactly, the fact that the United
States is internationally responsible for most acts of covert warfare in
which it participates makes it clear that the application of the marque
and reprisal clause to covert warfare is wholly consistent with the un-
derlying concerns of the clause. Furthermore, since the Framers' view
of the marque and reprisal clause embraced a broad range of hostilities
beyond the activities for which letters of marque and reprisal had tradi-
tionally been issued, it is arguable that modern-day covert warfare falls
within the constitutional understanding of the clause regardless of in-
ternational liability. As demonstrated above, the constitutional marque
and reprisal clause was not limited to the technical meaning of "letters
of marque and reprisal," but was viewed more broadly as granting
Congress power over all hostilities short of declared war, particularly
those utilizing private forces. While the requirement for congressional
authorization of covert warfare is well within the spirit of the marque
and reprisal clause, it may be within its letter as well.
II. THE CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
Part I of this Article argues that covert operations are the modern
analogy to the private armies and military expeditions of an earlier
time. If these two methods of "imperfect war" are functionally related
then the Framers' decision to vest the power to issue letters of marque
and reprisal in the legislative branch continues to be relevant and man-
dates that modern-day covert operations be authorized by Congress
pursuant to the marque and reprisal clause. In Part II, I will explore
the modern-day arguments against vesting authority over covert opera-
tions in Congress, and demonstrate the substantive inadequacy and va-
cuity of these arguments. This section also shows that modern covert
war and early modern private military forays are not only functionally
analogous but also raise many of the same policy and practical con-
cerns. The section concludes that arguments against congressional con-
trol over covert war are unpersuasive, and, furthermore, that the con-
cerns underlying the Framers' decision to place the power to issue
letters of marque and reprisal in Congress are implicated by contempo-
rary covert wars.
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A. Marque and Reprisal in the Early Republic
1. The Articles of Confederation and the
United States Constitution
Both the Articles of Confederation and the United States Constitu-
tion reflect the important role played by private armies and navies in
early American military history. The Articles of Confederation con-
tained two provisions regarding letters of marque and reprisal, which
addressed two issues: the body possessing the authority to grant letters
of marque and reprisal, and whether a formal declaration of war had
any impact on that distribution of power. Article IX reserved to Con-
gress the power "of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of
peace," while article VI allowed individual states to grant these letters
and to commission warships once war had been declared by Congress.94
The Continental Congress recognized that letters of marque and repri-
sal issued "in times of peace" could constitute state-authorized private
warfare short of declared war. Consequently, article IX ensured that
the initiation of all hostilities, not only declared war, would remain a
congressional preserve not to be invaded by the states.95 The conduct of
congressionally authorized war, however, could be shared jointly by the
central government and the individual states under article VI.
Whereas the drafters of the Articles of Confederation were pri-
marily concerned with the division of power between the federal gov-
ernment and the states, the Framers of the Constitution were also con-
cerned about the balance of congressional and executive power. The
continuing struggle between the two branches for preeminence in the
exercise of war powers was first manifest in the "make war" debates.
Concluding that the many-headed Congress was too slow-moving a
creature to determine the conduct of an ongoing war, while the initia-
tion and declaration of war was too awesome a responsibility to vest in
the executive alone, the Framers agreed that Congress should be
granted the power to "declare" war, and that the president, as com-
mander-in-chief, should direct the conduct of war once it was
4 ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION arts. VI, IX. Thus, during the revolutionary war
the states issued letters of marque pursuant to rules and regulations issued by the Con-
tinental Congress. See, e.g., 4 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 214, 229-
33, 247, 251-53 (1776) (compiled by K. Harris and S. Tilley).
, The only exceptions were that individual states were permitted to repel an in-
vasion, or threatened invasion, by an Indian nation where the danger was "so imminent
as not to admit of a delay," or to issue letters of marque or reprisal to repel pirates, in
the case where its waters were "infested by pirates." ART. OF CONFEDERATION art.
VI.
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declared. 6
The original drafts of the Constitution had not mentioned letters
of marque and reprisal at all.9 Immediately after the substitution of
"declare war" for "make war," 8 Elbridge Gerry recommended that
something be "inserted concerning letters of marque," since "he
thought [they were] not included in the power of war." 9 The timing of
Gerry's amendment indicated that he and others probably believed that
any possible narrowness implied by the authority to "declare war"
made it necessary to include the use of force in time of peace among the
enumerated congressional powers. Indeed, Joseph Story and others rec-
ognized that while the power to declare war would itself carry the inci-
dental power to grant letters of marque and reprisal, the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention may not have thought "the express
power to grant letters of marque and reprisal unnecessary, because it is
often a measure of peace, to prevent the necessity of a resort to war."1 00
By including the marque and reprisal clause in article I, section 8, the
Framers attempted to insure that Congress would always be the branch
to authorize armed hostilities against foreign nations, even if those hos-
96 See FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 318-20. The Framers
saw this balance between the executive and congressional war powers as a means for
allowing the president to conduct war and "repel sudden attacks," id. at 318, but not
"to commence war," id.
97 See generally, W. REVELEY, supra note 7, at 74-86 (marque and reprisal pro-
visions were not discussed until fourth month of the Constitutional Convention, and
were not part of earlier drafts of the Constitution).
11 Significantly, Gerry made his motion on August 18, 1787, the day after the
"make war" debate. See 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 318-29,
326.
,9 Id. at 326. The only significant mention of letters of marque and reprisal in the
pre-convention and ratification debates is Madison's comments that while the Articles
of Confederation granted Congress sole power over the grant of such licenses during
peacetime only, the Constitution extended this authority to wartime as well. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 49, at 299.
100 3 J. STORY, supra note 54, at 63. James Kent noted, "[R]eprisals by commis-
sions, or letters of marque and reprisal . . . is another mode of redress for some spe-
cific injury, . . . which is considered compatible with a state of peace." J. KENT,
supra note 49, at 61-62. Thomas Jefferson noted, "[Gleneral letters of marque and
reprisal" may be preferred to a formal declaration of war, "because on a repeal of their
edicts by the belligerent, a revocation of the letters of marque restores peace without the
delay, difficulties and ceremonies of a treaty." Letter from President Jefferson to Mr.
Lincoln (Nov. 13, 1808), 5 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at
387.
Similarly, the justification for the modern resort to covert paramilitary action is
often that such measures will prevent the necessity to resort to using United States
troops. See, e.g., Should the U.S. Fight Secret Wars?, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Sept.
1984, at 34 [hereinafter McFarlane statement] (statement of R. McFarlane, National
Security Advisor, May 13, 1984); N.Y. Times, March 6, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (reporting
request by President Reagan for $100 million in aid to ensure that United States troops
will never be sent to Nicaragua).
[Vol. 134:1035
COVERT WAR
tilities were launched in time of peace.
2. The Neutrality Act
Within a decade of the Constitution's ratification, Congress en-
acted the Neutrality Act of 1794,101 which prohibits private citizens
from engaging in armed hostilities against foreign nations at peace with
the United States. 10 2 Passage of this act was prompted by the difficul-
ties of enforcing President Washington's 1793 proclamation forbidding
United States citizens from engaging in acts of hostility against any of
the participants in France's war against England and Holland. 0 Al-
101 See Neutrality Act, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381-84 (1794) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 958-960, 962 (1976)).
102 The act's provisions make it a crime, within United States territory, to (a)
accept a commission to serve a foreign state, colony or people in wars against another
state or people with whom the United States is at peace, see 18 U.S.C. § 958 (1976);
(b) enlist or recruit a person to serve a foreign government or foreign army, see 18
U.S.C. § 959 (1976); (c) begin a military or naval expedition against any foreign
prince or state, see 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976); (d) fit out or arm a vessel with the intent
that such vessel either serve a foreign state or commit hostilities against the citizens or
property of a foreign country, see 18 U.S.C. § 962 (1976).
'03 In order to ensure that private citizens would not threaten American neutrality
in the war, Washington issued a proclamation forbidding United States citizens from
engaging in acts of hostility against any of the countries at war. See 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS, supra note 36, at 140; 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
156-57 (J. Richardson ed. 1896). The president's efforts were not fully effective. For
example, a jury failed to convict Gideon Henfield, a United States citizen who, because
he had enlisted on a French privateer that had attacked British ships, was indicted by a
federal grand jury. See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1122 n.7 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793)
(No. 6,360). While it was clear that Henfield had committed the acts charged, there
was general suspicion and uneasiness, both among the general population and the legal
community, as to whether violations of international law and a presidential proclama-
tion could provide a basis for a common law federal offense in the absence of a statute.
Although legal opinion was somewhat divided, the weight of opinion held that such a
basis did exist. See C. THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN CABI-
NET GOVERNMENT 172 (1931); Lobel, supra note 22, at 13-14 nn.74, 78. An account
of the trial is given in F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS
OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 49-89 (Philadelphia 1849) and in Henfield's Case, 11
F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360).
President Washington called on Congress to provide a federal statutory basis for
prosecuting violations of international law. In 1793, Washington asked Congress to
"extend the legal code and the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to many
cases which, though dependent on principles already recognized, demand some further
provisions." Congress responded by passing the Neutrality Act on June 5, 1794. See
Neutrality Act, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381, 383-84 (1794) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 958-960, 962 (1976)); President Washington's Annual Message to Congress (Dec.
3, 1793), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 36, at 22.
For a general history of the Neutrality Act, see C. FENWICK, THE NEUTRALITY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); C. HYNEMAN, THE FIRST AMERICAN NEU-
TRALITY (1974); C. THOMAS, supra; Curtis, The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions
as Applied by the United States, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 240 (1914); Lobel, supra note
22.
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though Congress did not specify its constitutional authority for enacting
the Neutrality Act, it clearly felt that the article I, section 8 war powers
were compromised when private individuals took aggressive action
against other nations in the absence of declared war."' The legislative
debates make no explicit reference to the marque and reprisal clause;'0 5
the Act itself and its subsequent history, however, demonstrate that
early congresses were unwilling to authorize executive utilization of
private armies or navies in times of peace. Unlike its English anteced-
ents, the American statute did not grant the executive discretion to au-
thorize enlistment or recruitment for a foreign state or to launch a hos-
tile expedition against a foreign nation.'0 6 This express denial of
executive discretion reflects the common understanding of both the ex-
ecutive'0 7 and the legislative branches that the president did not have
104 See Lobel, supra note 22, at 24-25, 27-30; see also 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 743,
744, 746 (1794) (Fourth Cong., 1st Sess.) (remarks of Rep. Ames, Rep. Hillhouse, and
Rep. Wadsworth) (expressing concern that actions of privateers were going to force the
United States into war).
... Although Congress did not articulate the constitutional basis for its assertion of
power over private warfare, the two possible grounds that have been asserted are the
powers granted to Congress by article I, § 8 to declare war and to "de-
fine ... offenses against the Law of Nations." See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S.
479, 488 (1887); Lobel, supra note 22, at 15-16, 27-37; Note, supra note 90, at 1966
& n.71; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), reprinted in
6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 313-14 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
106 The English statutes of 1713, 1736, and 1756 prohibited enlistment or recruit-
ment within Great Britain or Ireland for service to a foreign state and were clearly the
source of at least the first two sections of the Neutrality Act. See 12 Anne ch. 11
(1713); 9 Geo. 2, ch. 30 (1736); 29 Geo. 2, ch. 17 (1756); see also, Lobel, supra note
22, at 31-32 (stating that the American Neutrality Act clearly deviated from English
antecedents because it no longer conditioned crime on the absence of "leave or license of
his majesty").
107 Many early presidents, including Adams, Jefferson, Van Buren, and
Buchanan, clearly recognized that the power to authorize private military expeditions
against a foreign country was a congressional and not an executive power. In his inau-
gural address, John Adams noted that the position of the United States was one of
"neutrality and impartiality among the belligerent powers of Europe which has been
adopted by this government and so solemnly sanctioned by both Houses of Congress
and applauded by the legislatures of the States and the public opinion, until it shall be
otherwise ordained by Congress." Inaugural Address of President John Adams (Mar.
4, 1797), reprinted in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 103,
at 228, 231. Martin Van Buren noted, with respect to private expeditions against
Canada,
[W]hether the interest or the honor of the United States requires that they
should be made a party to any such struggle, and by inevitable conse-
quence to the war which is waged in its support, is a question which by
our Constitution is wisely left to Congress alone to decide. It is by the
laws already made criminal in our citizens to embarrass or anticipate that
decision by unauthorized military operations on their part.
Second Annual Message to Congress of President Martin Van Buren (Dec. 3, 1838),
reprinted in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra, at 487.
President James Buchanan also noted that such military expeditions were a "usur-
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the broad constitutional power to authorize private hostilities against a
nation with whom the United States was at peace.' 0 8
The courts have also acknowledged the division of authority man-
dated by article I, section 8, and have recognized that the Neutrality
Act reflected that constitutional framework. In Henfield's case,'0 9
which prompted the passage of the Neutrality Act, the Supreme Court
noted that the Constitution allowed no one citizen, not even the presi-
dent, to "lift up the sword of the United States. Congress alone have
power to declare war and to 'grant letters of marque and reprisal.' ,O
Later, in the 1806 case of United States v. Smith,"' the Court
held that a president could neither constitutionally nor statutorily au-
thorize a private military expedition against a foreign country except as
a response to an actual invasion." 2 In Smith, two civilians were in-
pation of the war-making power, which belongs alone to Congress." CONG. GLOBE,
35th Cong., 1st Sess. 217 (1858).
108 Those involved in the formation of American foreign policy in the 1790's con-
sidered the power to authorize private citizens to conduct hostilities abroad an exclu-
sively congressional power. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to
Governor Morris, American Minister to France (Aug. 16, 1793), reprinted in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 36, at 167-72. In their famous debate over the
authority of the president to issue the Proclamation of 1793, both Madison and Hamil-
ton relied on the constitutional assumption that citizens could not commit hostilities
until authorized by Congress. In support of the president's power to issue the Procla-
mation, Hamilton stated, "If the Legislature have a right to make war on the one
hand-it is on the other the duty of the Executive to preserve Peace till war is de-
clared." Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 49, at 40. Madison did not agree that the president had the
power to interpret the treaty with France or to declare neutrality, but he shared Ham-
ilton's view that "the duty of the executive to preserve peace" until the legislature au-
thorized war was enough to authorize the issuance of the Proclamation of 1793. See
Madison, Helvidius No. 5, reprinted in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note
105, at 180-82.
In this context, it is not surprising that Hamilton deleted the English provision
giving the executive discretionary power to authorize private hostilities in his draft of
the Neutrality Act. For Hamilton's role in drafting the statute, see Letter from Alexan-
der Hamilton to John Jay (June 4, 1794), reprinted in 16 THE PAPERS OF ALEXAN-
DER HAMILTON, supra note 49, at 456-57. Such authority would have been inconsis-
tent with an executive duty "to preserve peace till war is declared." Seventy years later
historian George Bemis distinguished the United States Neutrality Act from the British
Foreign Enlistment Act, which "left in the hands of the kings' ministers the power of
precipitating the kingdom into war . . . ." G. BEMIS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY: ITS
HONORABLE PAST, ITS EXPEDIENT FUTURE 84-85 (Boston 1866).
109 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1122 n.7 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360).
110 Id. at 1109; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to Gov-
ernor Morris, American Minister to France, supra note 108, at 168 ("If one citizen
has a right to go to war of his own authority, every citizen has the same . . . . But this
is not true . . . by our Constitution, which gives that power to Congress alone and not
to the citizens individually.").
n 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
12 The Reagan administration and its academic supporters seek to explain Smith
as simply holding that the prior knowledge of the president, as distinct from his author-
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dicted and tried for attempting to launch an expedition against Spanish
America."' 3 As part of their defense, they asserted that their acts had
been approved by President Jefferson.11 The Court ruled that even if
the President had authorized the expedition, the Neutrality Act, "on
which the indictment is founded, is expressed in general, unqualified
terms; it contains no condition, no exception; it invests no dispensing
power in any officer or person whatever." 1 5 The Court determined
that the Constitution,
[w]hich measures out the powers and defines the duties
of the president, does not vest in him any authority to set on
foot a military expedition against a nation with which the
United States are at peace. . . . If then, the president knew
and approved of the military expedition . . . it would not
justify the defendant . . . because the president does not pos-
sess a dispensing power. Does he possess the power of mak-
ing war? That power is exclusively vested in congress; for by
izatibn, was insufficient to shield the defendants from the Neutrality Act's proscrip-
tions. See Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Or-
der, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 91 n.194 (1986) (defendants in Smith sought to rely on
imputed presidential knowledge of and silence concerning their actions rather than on
presidential authorization of those actions).
This feeble attempt to distinguish Smith ignores the clear understanding of the
principles involved in that case. Attorney General Breckenridge summarized the princi-
ple involved in Smith: the evidence sought by the defendants was "wholly irrelevant;
for, the President having no power to arrest or dispense with the operation of th[e
Neutrality] Act, his assent, or even order, that it should be violated would not shield
from its pains and penalties those offending against it." Op. Att'y Gen. (1806), cited in
1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 284 n.1 (1922)
(emphasis added). Similarly, the government's attorney at trial "contended that the
president could not authorize any such measure [contravening the Neutrality Act]," 27
F. Gas. at 1221, and that "if he did so he would be guilty of crimes or misdemeanors."
Id. at 1204. Justice Patterson therefore held that "still less can [the president] author-
ize a person to do what the law forbids." Id. at 1230-31 (emphasis added). Indeed, as
recently as 1979, the Justice Department recognized that Smith stands for the proposi-
tion that the president cannot "authorize" paramilitary expeditions against friendly na-
tions. See Memorandum for Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Regard-
ing Applicability of the Neutrality Act to Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency 7
n.3 (Oct. 10, 1979) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
1"3 See Reinstein, An Early View of Executive Powers and Privilege: The Trial of
Smith and Ogden, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 309, 312 (1975).
114 Defendant Miranda met with both Secretary of State Madison and President
Jefferson twice before beginning his expedition. Miranda told Smith that the adminis-
tration had approved the adventure. Id. at 311.
At trial the defense offered an affidavit from Smith, stating that he expected to
prove from the testimony of the cabinet members "that the expedition and enterprise to
which the said indictment relates, was begun, prepared, and set on foot with the knowl-
edge and approbation of the president of the United States, and ... of the secretary
of the of the United States . . . ." United States v. Smith, 27 F. Gas. at 1196.
... 27 F. Gas. at 1229.
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the eighth section of the 1st article of the constitution, it is
ordained, that congress shall have power to declare war,
[and] grant letters of marque and reprisal. . .. 6
3. The Quasi-War with France
During the early years of the American Republic, letters of mar-
que and reprisal were issued in accordance with the Framers' plan that
Congress have sole responsibility over the authorization of private hos-
tilities. The first test of American fidelity to that decision was the
quasi-war with France, an undeclared war fought by public and pri-
vate armed forces from 1798 to 1800.117 The Adams administration
sought to curb French seizure of American vessels and to bankrupt the
lucrative business enjoyed by many French privateers of raiding Ameri-
can commerce ms-granting licenses to merchant ships to defend them-
selves.119 Assuming that only the legislature could license the arming of
merchant ships, 20 the administration asked Congress to authorize
118 Id. at 1229-30.
117 See S. MORISON, H. COMMAGER & W. LEUCHTENBURG, 1 THE GROWTH OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 321-23 (1980).
118 See A. SOFAER, supra note 5, at 139. On June 21, 1797, the Secretary of State
reported to Congress that 316 American ships had been captured by the French since
July, 1796. See 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 36, at 169, 267-92. In addi-
tion to the raids on commerce, the United States was also distressed by French embar-
goes on American ships at Bordeaux, broken contracts with American shippers, and
condemnation of American ships and cargoes in breach of French-American treaty obli-
gations. Furthermore, in 1797 the French issued a decree revoking the principle that
"free ships make free goods," thus allowing French warships to seize American
merchant ships carrying English goods. See A. DE CONDE, THE QUASI WAR: THE
POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801, at
17 (1966). The decree also declared enforceable a treaty provision that allowed ships
not carrying a list of crew and passengers to be considered lawful prize, a requirement
not met by most American merchant ships. Finally, in March of 1797 the French re-
fused to receive and then expelled Charles Cotesworth Pickney, the American Ambas-
sador to France. See id. at 16.
The French had substantial grievances of their own. See Gray v. United States, 21
Ct. CI. 340, 360 (1886). For a complete history of what became known as "the French
spoliations," see Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 411-26 (1887); Gray, 21 Ct.
Cl. at 345-67 (cases adjudicating, under a special act of Congress, the validity of the
claims of American merchants against the French). The United States offered a narrow
interpretation of the treaties of alliance and commerce with France-treaties that had
greatly aided the country during the Revolutionary War-in order to avoid the obliga-
tions they imposed. See id. at 352-60. Moreover, the 1795 Jay Treaty granted conces-
sions to Britain that conflicted with the provisions of the French-American treaties. See
id. at 356-57.
11" See 7 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 82, at 54-59; A. SOFAER, supra note 5,
at 141.
120 The Adams administration was careful to defer to Congress. See A. SOFAER,
supra note 5, at 137-66. "Adams seldom acted without prior congressional approval."
Id. at 164. "It remains for Congress to prescribe such regulations as will enable our
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merchants to arm in self-defense-or, as Alexander Hamilton put it, to
"Grant Qualified letters of marck,"' 21 or special letters of marque with
authority to repel aggressions and capture assailants.'22
Throughout this period, the congressional authority to issue letters
of marque and reprisal was strictly protected. Midway through the
war, when President Adams lifted his executive order restricting the
arming of merchant ships, he was criticized for violating separation of
powers principles. James Madison and others thought it was beyond
the president's power even to revoke his own executive order.'1 3 Lifting
the restriction was seen as granting the merchants an "indirect license
to arm, "124 an action that could only be taken by Congress. Despite the
uproar, however, the administration generally agreed with Congress
that any measure permitting merchant ships to use force would have to
be authorized by Congress, 25 and Adams continued to abide by his
promise to enforce the Neutrality Act to prevent American ships from
attacking foreign vessels.'
26
seafaring citizens to defend themselves against violations of the law of nations ..... 7
ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 82, at 57 (Presidential Message of John Adams). Ham-
ilton wrote to McHenry in March, 1797, "[Wlhen Congress meet, get them to lay an
Embargo with liberty to the executive to grant licenses" to armed vessels. Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (Mar. 1797), reprinted in 20 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 49, at 574; see also Letter from Oliver Wol-
cott, Jr. to Alexander Hamilton (Mar. 31, 1797), reprinted in id. at 571 (urging the
president to recommend to Congress "the arming of our vessels for defence with the
right of capturing the attacking force").
121 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (March 1797), reprinted
in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 49, at 574.
122 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to T. Sedgwick (Jan. 20, 1797), reprinted in
id. at 474.
123 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, reprinted in 6 WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 105, at 313; see also 8 ANNALS OF CONG.,
supra note 40, at 1324 (remarks of Rep. Nicholas) ("[The Executive had taken mea-
sures which would lead to war . . . he had never heard it doubted that Congress had
the power over the progress of what led to war, as well as the power of declaring war;
but if the President could take the measures which he had taken, with respect to arm-
ing merchant vessels, he, and not Congress, had the power of making war.").
Madison's views of the illegality of the president's actions were based not on the consti-
tutional war powers of Congress but on the president's actions being either a violation
of the law of nations, which was the "law of the land," or a usurpation of the legisla-
tive power "to define the law of nations." Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson, reprinted in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 105, at 313.
124 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, reprinted in 6 WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 105, at 313.
125 Secretary of State McHenry noted that the president would annul the circular
letter prohibiting arming and "therefore submit[] it to Congress to prescribe such regu-
lations and penalties in the case as may be thought proper and necessary." Letter from
James McHenry to John Adams (May 14, 1798), reproduced in ADAMS PAPERS Reel
387 (microfilm, completed in 1969).
12I See Message to Congress of Mar. 19, 1798, reprinted in 8 ANNALS OF CONG.,
supra note 40, at 1271-72; see also id. at 1330-31 (remarks of Rep. Dana) (stating
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The Adams administration approached Congress several times in
the course of a year before the legislature would agree even to authorize
merchant vessels to arm in self-defense. In June 1797 Congress refused
to authorize the arming of merchant vessels to defend themselves.' 27
Various Congressmen noted that the power to authorize merchants to
arm in self-defense was a congressional, not an executive, power. 28
When the measure to authorize the arming of merchant ships was rein-
troduced, and once more defeated, in December, numerous Congress-
men noted that "it was proper to regulate the arming of merchant ships
by a Legislative provision instead of an Executive one."' 29 In June of
1798, the House debated and finally passed a bill authorizing merchant
ships to arm to defend themselves.'"0 The measure was strictly limited
to defensive reprisals. Section 3 of the bill prohibited merchant vessels
from attacking ships of nations at peace with the United States.'' Fur-
thermore, no authority was given to attack French warships that had
not attacked an American ship," 2 nor was "the President authorized to
fit out privateers .... .,13 As Representative Harper explained,
"[O]ur vessels will only have power to use their arms in repelling...
and to make reprisals on the aggressors by capture."' 34
that the arming of merchant ships was "for the purpose of defence merely, and not to
cruise or plunder").
127 See 7 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 82, at 282.
12 For example, Representative Dayton thought it unwise to "establish the prin-
ciple, that merchant ships have a right to arm, without an act of the Legislature to
sanction the practice." Id. at 282. Representative Nicholas noted that no one "would
contend that the President had the power to [prohibit or authorize arming], according
to his will." Id. at 271.
129 Id. at 764 (remarks of Rep. Sewall); see also id. at 777 (remarks of Rep.
Dana) (noting the necessity for congressional action).
110 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 40, at 1899-1917, 1926. On June 6,
1798, Representative Foster proposed authorizing the president to issue general letters
of marque and reprisal against all French ships, unarmed as well as armed, until
France revoked its decrees authorizing the capture of American ships. See id. at 1879.
Representative Sitgreaves thought the issuance of general letters of marque and reprisal
was tantamount to declaring war, a power that is "by the Constitution placed in this
department of the Government [Congress]." Id. at 1884-85. Representative Gallatin
argued that Foster's resolution was little different from one of Sitgreaves' own. See id.
at 1881. Sitgreaves responded that his motion was for "special reprisal, in cases limited
and defined; the present propositions are for letters of general marque and repri-
sal . . . ." Id. at 1884. Deliberation on Foster's motions was postponed. See id. at
1890-91.
11 Id. at 1899.
112 Id. at 1902.
1.. Id. (statement of Rep. Sitgreaves).
1s4 Id. at 1908 (statement of Rep. Harper); see also id. at 1915-16 (statement of
Rep. Gallatin) (distinguishing this bill from an amendment proposed by Rep. Harper
that would have allowed merchantmen to take or destroy any French ship that had
captured an American ship, stating that he considered the amendment "the same as
granting letters of marque and general reprisal"); id. at 1915-16 (statement of Rep.
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Administration efforts to secure congressional authorization of of-
fensive reprisals by merchant seamen also met with great resistance. In
April, 1798, Congress debated a presidential request to allow, among
other things, private vessels to attack French ships."3 5 The executive's
supporters in Congress 13 6 also introduced a resolution permitting public
and private vessels to capture or destroy armed French vessels in cer-
tain limited circumstances. 13 7 Both sides of the debate agreed that the
president could not instruct private or public vessels to attack and cap-
ture armed French vessels that had not attacked them first without con-
gressional authorization."8 Representative James Bayard, a Federalist
Sitgreaves) (responding to Gallatin that even with the proposed amendment the bill
would still be "a part of that system of special reprisals already adopted . . . [it gives]
a power to . . . merchant ships [only] to take such vessels . . . as have actually
[taken our vessels]").
135 See A. DE CONDE, supra note 118, at 70-71.
136 See e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 40, at 1820 (statement of Rep.
Kittera) (arguing that commanders of United States vessels should be allowed to make
reprisals when French privateers were within American ports).
137 See id. at 1783; see also A. SOFAER, supra note 5, at 156. (The authorization
for public armed vessels was broader than for private armed vessels. Private vessels
could only capture and destroy a French vessel that had attacked them or had captured
a United States vessel. Public vessels could capture and destroy a French vessel that
was found attacking any United States vessel or was within a certain distance of the
United States coast, or had been captured. This distinction reflected the perceived need
for stricter control over the authorization of private forces.).
13' Representative Gallatin noted that if "French privateers were committing dep-
redations . . . within our jurisdiction . . . [even] without the bill, the President had
full power to apply . . . any . . . force at his disposal, in repelling the outrage." 8
ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 40, at 1820. Gallatin's remarks, however, did not imply
that the president could go beyond repelling attacks on commerce within United States
jurisdictions without congressional authorization. As a spokesman for the Republican
opposition to war measures, Gallatin argued that letters of marque "are given to pri-
vate vessels alone; . . . [b]ut these resolutions are neither general nor specific letters of
marque. They are instructions to our public vessels to make war." Id. at 1809.
The Federalists, on the other hand, believed that the issuance of letters of marque
and reprisal was distinct from declaring war, especially when, as here, Congress would
be utilizing that power to grant specific, limited, and defensive reprisals. While both
Republicans and Federalists recognized that the authorization to private vessels to cap-
ture French armed vessels was a form of letters of marque and reprisal, their main
source of disagreement was the effect of granting such letters. The Federalists viewed
the authorization, which was limited to armed vessels located off the American coast, as
a special reprisal, rather than as general letters of marque and reprisal that would
authorize "indiscriminate attack on all vessels belonging to the French Republic." Id.
at 1803 (statement of Rep. Sitgreaves). They concluded, therefore, that such measures
did "not amount to a cause of war," because they were "measures of strict defense." Id.
at 1803.
In contrast, Gallatin and other Republicans saw these measures as "neither more
nor less than war." Id. at 1806 (statement of Rep. Venable); see also id. at 1814
(statement of Rep. Lyons) (describing the bill "as a declaration of war"); id. at 1816-
17 (statement of Rep. McDowell) ("[A]s the bill now stood, it was tantamount to a
declaration of war."); id. at 1826 (statement of Rep. Macon) (commenting that the bill
could "be in effect a declaration of war"); id. at 1807 (statement of Rep. Williams)
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supporter of strong military measures, stated, "He had no doubt, that
when one nation infringes the rights of another," the wronged nation
could take measure against the wrongdoer, but that "in this country,
. . . the President has no power to act in the case. Congress only could
authorize reprisals."1 ' Representative Albert Gallatin, the leader of
the Republican opposition to war measures, quickly agreed with Bay-
ard: "[T]he President had not power to employ an armed force to make
reprisals of vessels within our jurisdiction which may have taken ves-
sels belonging to the United States [outside our seacoast]."' 40
On July 9, 1798, Congress finally enacted legislation authorizing
the president to commission private ships to attack and capture armed
French vessels. 14  Again, substantial debate took place as to whether
the president should be authorized to commission private ships in this
way,' 42 and again, the general assumption of all participants was that
the authorization of such hostilities by private parties, even in self-de-
fense, was a congressional power' That this measure was controlled by
the marque and reprisal clause also appears in the debates.L
43
B. Covert Operations and Congressional Authority
The constitutional understanding of the Framers and early leaders
of the Republic outlined above would seem to bar the modern-day exec-
utive use and authorization of paramilitary troops, because the utiliza-
(noting that the resolutions were "nothing short of a declaration of war").
Political considerations were obviously strong factors in how one characterized
these measures. The Federalists, perceiving a public reluctance to engage in war, chose
to characterize the measures as specific reprisals for self-defense. The Republican view
that the measures constituted war was an effort to sway public opinion against using
more force. The salient point, however, is that both sides understood that measures
beyond response to a direct attack required congressional authorization.
139 Id. at 1828.
1,0 Id. at 1831 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1832 (statement of Rep. Craik)
(Absent congressional authorization the president "certainly could not employ [force] in
the manner directed by this bill.").
News of the appearance of a French privateer off the Delaware coast led the
House to approve the resolution late on Friday, May 25, 1798, instead of waiting until
Monday. The reason for the urgency was the belief that to wait would leave the presi-
dent without constitutional power to act over the weekend. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG.,
supra note 40, at 1831-34.
141 See Act of July 9, 1798, ch. XX, 1 Stat. 578 (1798).
142 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 40, at 2067-82.
143 Representative Dana noted that the granting of letters of marque and reprisal
would be consistent with a state of peace and then stated that this measure is "less
offensive than the granting [of] letters of marque and reprisal indiscriminately against
French vessels; for it is restricted to capturing armed vessels, . . . it is of the nature of
limited reprisal." Id. at 2075-76. Representative Smith agreed that letters of marque
and reprisal "are not absolute war; but to authorize the fitting out of privateers against
any Power is war direct." Id. at 2068.
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tion of these forces is analogous to the use of private forces to conduct
warfare in eighteenth century America. 44 Various rationales, however,
have been marshalled to justify primary executive authority over covert
action, the most important of which are the expansion of the executive
foreign affairs power in the last century and the importance of secrecy
in the conduct of covert operations. This section of the Article will
show that when subjected to scrutiny these justifications do not support
the claims of presidential power. Furthermore, it will explain how the
policies underlying the decision to place the marque and reprisal power
in the legislature-fears about the uniquely destructive potential of pri-
vate armies and the desire to make entry into armed conflict of any
kind difficult-are equally compelling in the context of covert paramili-
tary activities. Indeed, these similarities support, far more strongly than
the foreign affairs argument undermines, the application of the marque
and reprisal clause to covert operations.
1. The President as the Sole Organ of the Federal
Government in Foreign Affairs
Numerous presidents and commentators have argued that presi-
dents' plenary power over foreign affairs1 45 justifies their command of
CIA paramilitary operations,1 46 and that any decision to rely on
paramilitary force as an instrument of United States foreign policy is
inherently executive. 147 According to these proponents of executive
power there is no limitation on a president's or the CIA's power to
authorize paramilitary actions against foreign governments apart from
statutes mandating adherence to congressional oversight require-
ments.148 Furthermore, the practical need of covert paramilitary opera-
144 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
1,1 In the absence of specific constitutional directives concerning the power to con-
duct foreign affairs, United States presidents have historically claimed possession of the
power over foreign policymaking. Throughout history, Congress has, at varying levels
of intensity, disputed these executive claims of power. See R. HoxIE, COMMAND DECI-
SION AND THE PRESIDENCY 3-32 (1977); A. SOFAER, supra note 5, at 94-101, 137-61,
196-208 (discussing foreign affairs debates during the presidencies of Washington, Ad-
ams, and Jefferson). Presidents have normally been successful in advancing their con-
stitutional interpretations to justify their actions. See R. Pious, THE AMERICAN PRESI-
DENCY 332 (1979). Executive dominance of foreign policymaking is also recognized and
endorsed by many contemporary commentators. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, THE PRESI-
DENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, at 255-56 (1984).
146 See, e.g., Houston Memorandum, supra note 14, at 1-2; Military Hearings,
supra note 13, at 1604.
141 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., House Intelligence Hearings, supra note 12, at 1756, 1760 (testi-
mony of Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency).
[Vol. 134:1035
COVERT WAR
tions for discretion, speed, and secrecy mandate a uniform, focused con-
trol that only the executive branch can provide. 49
This defense of executive supremacy, however, is inadequate for
practical as well as legal reasons. First, the foreign affairs power of the
president is limited by two external sources: the congressional war
power and international law. Second, secrecy in the conduct of covert
warfare is impossible as a practical matter, and the pretense of secrecy
is necessary only where covert activities violate international law-the
very source from which the foreign affairs power derives its legitimacy.
a. The Legal Rationale for Executive Control over Covert War
As the Supreme Court has observed, the foreign affairs power
stems not from any affirmative constitutional grant, but rather from the
powers attributed to sovereignty by international law.""0 Deriving the
executive's foreign affairs power'from international law suggests a con-
comitant limitation on that power."' 1 Both James Madison" 2 and Al-
149 See infra notes 190-204 and accompanying text.
150 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); see also
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) (The president's duty to enforce the law is not
limited to execution of statutes, but includes the enforcement of the "rights, duties and
obligations growing out of ... our international relations.").
151 For discussions of how the inherent powers derived from international law
must be limited by that law, see The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44 (1890); G. SUTHERLAND, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL POWERS AND WORLD AFFAIRS 94, 141 (1919); Lobel, The Limits of Con-
stitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L.
REv. 1071, 1114-30 (1985); Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude
Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 968 (1982).
152 See Madison, Helvidius No. II, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 105, at 159-60 (stating that the executive is bound to execute international law as
law of the land).
Five years later Madison again argued that the executive could not act in deroga-
tion of international law. During the quasi-war with France, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 117-43, President Adams revoked an executive order he had issued prohib-
iting the arming of American merchant ships in U.S. ports as a violation of neutrality.
See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. Madison, among others, claimed Ad-
ams had granted the merchants "an indirect license to arm." Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson, reprinted in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 105, at 313. Madison complained that the executive had no power to grant such
an indirect license:
The first instructions were no otherwise legal than as they were in pursu-
ance of the law of nations, and, consequently in execution of the law of the
land. The revocation of the instructions is a virtual change of the law, and
consequently a usurpation by the Executive of a legislative power.
Id. During the ensuing debate over Franco-American relations, various Congressmen
noted, without contradiction, that the president could use the nation's armed forces only
in a "manner authorized by the law of nations." 8 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 40,
at 1807 (statement of Rep. Williams); accord id. at 1806 (statement of Rep. Venable).
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exander Hamilton15 3 recognized that the executive was constitutionally
required to follow international law in the conduct of foreign policy. In
Brown v. United States, 54 the majority,15 the dissent, 1 5  and the Jus-
tice Department 57 all recognized that the scope of executive war pow-
ers must be construed consistently with international law. This position
has been followed by other attorneys general, 58 commentators, 59 and
courts.1 60 This conclusion flows logically from the well-recognized prin-
158 See Hamilton, Pacficus No. 1, reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra, note 49, at 40, 43 (executive bound to execute international law of
neutrality "to avoid giving a cause of war to foreign powers").
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
155 Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the majority, "[A] construction [of the Con-
stitution] ought not lightly to be admitted which would give to a declaration of war an
effect in this country it does not possess elsewhere." Id. at 124-25. Marshall thus drew
on international law to interpret the president's constitutional powers.
156 Id. at 129, 153 (Story, J., dissenting).
157 The Government argued that the "executive may seize and the Courts con-
demn all property which, according to the modern law of nations, is subject to confisca-
tion, although it might require an act of the legislature to justify the condemnatio[n] of
that property which, according to modern usage, ought not to be confiscated." Id. at
128.
158 Attorney General William Wirt concluded in an 1822 opinion that the obliga-
tion of the president as executive officer to enforce the laws of the country extended to
the "general laws of nations." 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 570 (1822). Attorney General
James Speed wrote that the laws of war,
[1]ike the other laws of nations[,] . . . are of binding force upon the de-
partments and citizens of the Government, though not defined by a law of
Congress . . . . [U]nder the Constitution of the United States no license
can be given by any department of the Government to take human life in
war, except according to the law and usages of war.
11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299-301 (1865).
159 See Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 169
(1922) ("Courts have held that the President's power in conducting war is limited by
international law and any action he may authorize contrary to that law is void.");
Paust, Is the President Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land?-Foreign Affairs
and National Security Re-examined, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 719, 726-27 (1982)
("[D]uring the conduct of 'military operations,' the President . . . is . . . bound by
international law . . . ."); Wright, The Power of the Executive to Use Military Forces
Abroad, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 43, 49 (1969) (suggesting a requirement of congressional
approval if "purpose of hostility is in violation of international law"). But see L. HEN-
KIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 171 (1972) (stating that the presi-
dent can override international law and treaty obligations); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 135 reporter's
note 3 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) (same).
16 In Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870), the dissenting jus-
tices wrote that the president had no power to violate international law, because even
Congress lacked such power. Id. at 315-16 (Field, J., dissenting). The majority as-
sumed a lack of presidential authority to act at all without congressional action. Id. at
304-14; see also Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980) ("In-
ternational law is a part of the laws of the United States. . . ."), affd on other
grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir
1981). But see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (dicta suggesting that
executive authorization can override international law). Just recently the Eleventh Cir-
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ciple that international law is an integral part of the law of the land.",,
The president is constitutionally obliged to execute the law of the land,
whatever its source, and any derogation of international law requires
the express approval of Congress. 162 Thus, even assuming that the ex-
ecutive branch has the authority to undertake foreign intelligence activ-
ities, such power can only be exercised "in accordance with applicable
norms of international law. '" 3
The limits placed on the exercise of executive power by interna-
tional treaty obligations are similar to the restraints imposed by inter-
national law. Because the Supreme Court has held that the Constitu-
tion accords treaties the same status as statutes under domestic law,1"
the president should be required to adhere to the law laid down by
those treaties just as he is obliged to obey statutory law. 5 The Su-
preme Court held in Cook v. United States' 6  that executive power is
limited by treaty, 167 a position supported by the statements of early
cuit held that the actions of a Cabinet official override international law in domestic
courts. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1146 (11th Cir. 1986).
161 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792); Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law
of the United States (pts. 1 & 2), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1952), 101 U. PA. L. REV.
792 (1953); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 131 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
162 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Justice
Jackson noted, "[W]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb." Id. at 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). The well-established rule that "an act of Congress ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of nations, if any other construction remains," Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804), reflects a presump-
tion that Congress will keep the rules of international law in force. Thus, presidential
violations of international law are contrary to the implied will of Congress, and there-
fore, under Jackson's analysis, the executive power is at its lowest ebb. See also Q.
WRIGHT, supra note 159, at 298 ("The President has no power to direct the capture of
private property without express authorization of statute, treaty or international law.").
See also Lobel, supra note 151, at 1114-21 (discussion of the argument that the execu-
tive's foreign affairs powers are limited by international law).
1"' See Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 33.
14 See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Head Money
Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 590 (1884).
1"5 See Lobel, supra note 151, at 1071, 1121-29. Indeed, various courts have as-
serted the power to adjudicate whether executive regulations are in conformity with a
treaty. See, e.g., Collins v. Weinberger, 707 F.2d 1518, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United
States v. Decher, 600 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1979).
166 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
117 The defendants in Cook were Coast Guard officers who had seized a British
liquor-smuggling ship outside the boundary set for such seizures by an Anglo-Ameri-
can treaty. The government argued that the executive had ratified the seizure so that
the ship should be held forfeit despite the treaty violation. The Supreme Court
disagreed:
The objections to the seizure is not that is was wrongful merely be-
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congressional leaders and statesmen... as well as modern commenta-
tors.' 69 The Supreme Court has permitted Congress to enact statutes in
derogation of treaties and customary law,170 but such derogation power
has never been extended to unilateral executive actions. Decisions to
breach treaty obligations or customary law have the potential to create
international strains and repercussions far more serious than routine
foreign policy decisions. Separation of powers concerns dictate that if
such actions must be taken they should be subject to the greater scru-
tiny provided by a decisionmaking process involving both houses of
Congress as well as the president.
An international law limitation on the president's foreign affairs
power, however, does not indicate who is to determine whether a par-
cause made by one upon whom the Government had not conferred author-
ity to seize at the place where the seizure was made. The objection is that
the Government itself lacked power to seize, since by the Treaty it had
imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority .... Our Govern-
ment, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to sub-
ject the vessel to our laws. To hold that adjudication may follow a wrong-
ful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty.
Id. at 121-22.
188 Jefferson noted that although a subsequent law may override a treaty "the
Legislature is the only power which can control a treaty." Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to James Madison (May 31, 1798), reprinted in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 41 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903). The 1798 debates in Congress on rescinding
American treaties with France generally recognized that, until a declaration is made by
Congress annulling the treaties, "they are binding upon all the departments of the
Government, as law of the land." 8 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 40, at 1901-02
(remarks of Rep. Sitgreaves); see also id. at 1902 (remarks of Rep. Sitgreaves) (absent
contrary authorization from Congress, "the treaty is the rule of conduct for the depart-
ments of Government, and for our citizens generally"); id. at 2120 (remarks of Rep.
Sewall) (only Congress has the power to suspend a treaty).
Although Jefferson believed that only the legislature had the constitutional power
to breach treaties, he apparently saw executive treaty violations as political questions
not cognizable in the courts. When asked by the French ambassador what redress ex-
isted if the president declines to observe a treaty, Jefferson responded, "[T]he Constitu-
tion had made the President the last appeal." 4 J. MOORE, supra note 43, at 681.
Since Jefferson also argued, "[T]he Legislature is the only power which can control a
treaty," Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 31, 1798), reprinted
in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 41, "[or] declare [it] infringed and
rescinded," JEFFERSON'S MANUAL OF SENATE PROCEDURE, reprinted in SENATE
MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 668 (1975), his comments to the
French ambassador should be understood as a statement about judicial review rather
than as a determination that the executive need not observe treaty obligations.
1"69 See Moore, The Justiciability of Challenges to the Use of Military Forces
Abroad, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 85, 102-03 (1969).
170 See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190 (1888); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). Lower federal
courts have consistently followed the Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Diggs v. Shultz,
470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); Tag v. Rogers, 267
F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960); Schroeder v. Bissell, 5
F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925).
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ticular paramilitary operation is in violation of international law.
Whether a use of force is defensive or aggressive;171 whether an emer-
gency situation exists which justifies the use of executive authority ex-
ists; 17 2 whether another nation's conduct justifies an executive determi-
nation that a treaty obligation with the United States has been
breached; 17 3 whether the United States is "directing" or "substantially
participating" in the activities of private armed bands;1"4 or whether
United States troops have been placed in a situation "where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum-
stances" 175-all require an initial factual determination on which any
separation of powers analysis must turn.
If the president is allowed to make the initial factual determina-
tion, she will invariably find that the facts permit the exercise of execu-
tive power. The president will always claim that she is using force de-
fensively, that the other nation breached the treaty first, that an
emergency situation exists, and that United States troops are not in
imminent danger of being involved in hostilities.1 76 The limitation
placed on executive foreign affairs power by international law, how-
ever, precludes executive action without congressional approval in cer-
tain situations. Actions that presumptively raise serious international
law concerns, or are likely to violate international law, must be initially
reviewed by Congress. Where an activity is inherently suspect under
international law, the president should not be allowed to determine
171 Compare U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, prohibiting aggression, with id. art.
51, permitting self-defense.
172 There are standards for determining whether an emergency situation exists in
other contexts. See, e.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §
1701 (1982) (defining conditions under which the president can act in an economic
emergency).
173 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 60, 80
I.L.M. 679, 701, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 893-94 (1969) (setting forth the
standard for determining when there has been such a substantial breach of a treaty that
the other parties to the treaty no longer need abide by it).
174 See United Nations General Assembly Definition of Aggression, supra note 87
and accompanying text.
175 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (1) (1982).
117 For example, despite congressional attempts to set standards defining when the
executive may use the armed forces and when she may declare economic embargoes
against other countries, see, e.g., id. at §§ 1541-1548; The International Economic
Emergencies Power Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982) (permitting executive action
in situations presenting an "unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to the national se-
curity, foreign policy, or economy of the United States"), presidents have managed to
avoid those requirements by claiming that they have, in fact, met the standard in each
situation. For executive evasions of these standards, see Ratner & Cole, The Force of
Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers Resolution, 17 Loy. L. REv. 715, 742-
50 (1984); J. Bingham, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1985, at E22, col. 3 (letter to the editor
describing evasion of the standards for declaring an embargo).
1986] 1075
1076 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
unilaterally whether it falls within a proscribed category; preliminary
congressional examination and approval are required.
Paramilitary operations backed by the United States raise pre-
cisely these concerns. Covert paramilitary operations constitute resorts
to force that are, at worst, in violation of international law, and, at best,
of doubtful legality. Indeed, United States aid to the contras in Nicara-
gua, 177 the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and the overthrow of the
Guatemalan government in 1954 were all in violation of the United
Nations charter's proscription on the use of force.'" None of these acts
involved an American response to an armed attack against the United
States or any other nation.179 Because paramilitary operations are
likely to raise serious international legal questions, there must be
checks on their use by the executive. Where Congress determines that a
particular operation is in conformity with international requirements, it
can authorize overt assistance and publicly defend the United States
position. If, however, a proposed paramilitary program violates inter-
national law, that program may be authorized, if at all, only with the
concurrence of both the executive and legislative branches of our
government."1 0
177 See, e.g., Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.) (I.C.J. June 27, 1986) (Merits); Memorandum of the National Emer-
gency Civil Liberties Committee on the United States, Nicaragua and The World
Court (1985) reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. H4138-39 (daily ed. June 12, 1985);
Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States & Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of
Contemporary Interventions, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 621, 680-82 (1985). But cf. id. at 680
(quoting Professor John N. Moore's views that United States actions are legal on self-
defense grounds, according to the Monroe Doctrine's definition of self-defense).
18 See Rowles, The United States, The OAS & The Dilemma of the Undesirable
Regime, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 385, 396, 399-404 (1983) (stating that paramili-
tary operations against Cuba, Guatemala, and Nicaragua violate the charters of the
United Nations and Organization of American States); see also Falk, supra note 68, at
146-47 (describing CIA covert activities carried on without the consent of the foreign
governments in Chile, Vietnam, Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Cuba, Greece, and
Cambodia).
17 The United States government contends that its actions against Nicaragua
have been taken in legitimate self-defense, in response to Cuban and Nicaraguan ag-
gression against El Salvador in the form of military aid to the anti-government rebels.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 132, REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR
BORDERS: SANDINISTA INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA 1-2 (1985). If Nicara-
gua has been aiding the El Salvadoran rebels, such aid does not, in and of itself, consti-
tute an armed attack, and thus does not justify acts taken in self-defense. See I.
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 370 (1963). Actual incur-
sions by rebels controlled by or acting as an instrumentality of another state are neces-
sary to constitute an armed attack. See Meeker, Vietnam and the International Law of
Self-Defense, 56 DEP'T ST. BULL. 54, 59 (1967). The United States claim has been
rejected by the World Court, which held that no armed attack by Nicaragua has taken
place. See Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicargua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) §§ 211, 229-230 (I.C.J. June 27, 1986) (Merits).
180 See Wright, The Power of the Executive to Use Military Force Abroad, 10 VA.
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In addition to the limitations imposed by international law, the
president's foreign affairs power is also limited by the congressional
war power. As Justice Sutherland wrote in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright, any executive foreign affairs power derived from international
law "must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of
the Constitution. 18 1 Article I, section 8 of the Constitution requires
that opportunities for unilateral executive action utilizing force abroad
be narrowly circumscribed.1 8 2 Since the decision to use armed force is
explicitly given to Congress, any exception to this rule deriving from
international law must be limited to those categories of hostilities that
are clearly permissible under international norms. In dubious or ques-
tionable cases, it is for Congress to determine whether or not national
security or our international obligations require us to resort to arms. 83
The precedents upholding executive authority to use force to pro-
tect American citizens184 and repel armed attack 3 5 are consistent with
these principles. Article 51 of the United Nations charter clearly per-
mits a nation to use force in self-defense to repel armed attack. 88 Some
commentators have argued that the concept of self-defense should be
expanded to include any significant threat to United States national se-
curity, 8" but these arguments have been rejected by most international
law scholars.188 Indeed, the World Court has recently rejected by a
wide margin the United States argument that it was entitled to aid the
Nicaraguan contras under the rubric of collective self-defense, holding
that collective self-defense is applicable only to respond to an armed
attack and not to lesser forms of possible international delicts posing
security threats.18 9 The right to self-defense beyond responding to an
J. INT'L L. 43, 49 (stating that congressional approval necessary where hostilities are
"in violation of international law").
181 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
181 See infra notes 246-62 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 162.
184 See Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
185 See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
188 See U.N. CHARTER, art. 51, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUS-
TICE, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, STATUTE AND RULES OF COURT 16
(1947) ("Nothing in the ...charter shall impair the inherent right of ... self-de-
fense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations."); D.
BowErr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87-90 (1958); L. HENKIN, How
NATIONS BEHAVE 141-45 (2d ed. 1979); see also Moore, Grenada and The Interna-
tional Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145, 153-54 (1984) (stating that the use
of force to protect citizens is lawful).
187 See, e.g., Rostow, Law is Not a Suicide Pact, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at
35, col. 3.
I" See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 159, at 141-45; P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW
OF NATIONS 165-6 (1948); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 90, at 156.
189 See Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
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armed attack, therefore, is certainly not a settled international law stan-
dard.19 Such expansive claims would eviscerate both constitutional and
international limitations on executive uses of force abroad, because the
president can always claim that the actions of other nations threaten
national security and must be defended against with arms.
b. The Secrecy Rationale for Executive Power
The importance of secrecy and discretion in high level exchanges
among national leaders has always been a cornerstone of the argument
for the executive's plenary foreign affairs power. Open debate and pub-
lic acknowledgment of paramilitary operations are admittedly in funda-
mental conflict with this perceived need for secrecy. The constitutional
framework, however, strikes a careful balance between the require-
ments of secrecy in foreign policy and the need for democratic decision-
making. 9 Where secrecy was seen as paramount, the Framers pro-
vided the executive with ample authority. For example, as John Jay
pointed out in the Federalist Papers, the negotiation of treaties often
requires absolute secrecy and immediate dispatch. 92 The president,
therefore, was vested with the power to negotiate treaties, while the
House was excluded entirely from the treaty ratification process.1 93
Similarly, in conducting "military operations . . . secrecy was neces-
sary sometimes" 9 4 and thus the president was made commander-in-
chief of the armed forces.
19 5
Decisions whether to use force, however, were made the exclusive
preserve of Congress. The Framers gave the power to declare war and
to issue letters of marque and reprisal to Congress to ensure that hostil-
ities using private or public forces would not be initiated without public
debate. As James Madison noted, if American interests require a resort
to force, armed hostilities should be undertaken "'not in an underhand
U.S.) §§ 211, 229-230 (I.C.J. June 27, 1986) (Merits). But see id. at §§ 172-173
(Schwebel, J., dissenting).
... Compare Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 559-63
(1963); L. HENKIN, supra note 186, at 141-45, 295-96 (stating that Article 51 of the
United Nation's Charter permits the use of force in self-defense only when there has
been an actual armed attack) with MacChesney, Some Comments on the Quarantine of
Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592, 596-97 (1963); MeDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quaran-
tine and Self-Defense, in id. at 597, 599-601 (1963) (justifying United States action
toward Cuba as anticipatory self-defense).
191 See generally D. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING
FATHERS: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS (1981).
192 See THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay).
183 See D. HOFFMAN, supra note 191, at 32-33.
19 3 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 326 (remarks of
George Mason).
19' See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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and illicit way, but in a way consistent with the laws of war and be-
coming our national character.'"196 Moreover, as current members of
the House have recognized, executive initiation of covert war "com-
mit[s] us to a specific foreign policy that has never been openly de-
fended and supported, and whose outcome cannot be guided by our
own democratic institutions." 97 Thus, reliance on covert action offers a
secret shortcut around democratic decisionmaking 98 that distorts the
democratic process.99 and is fundamentally incompatible with the de-
mands of our constitutional system.200
Supporters of executive power often argue that Congress's funding
power adequately serves the need for democratic decisionmaking in the
area of covert activities because the press and the public learn of covert
operations when Congress debates whether to continue funding the op-
erations. 201 This argument must fail-only when Congress is involved
in the decision of whether to launch these operations from the start is
the democratic process truly served. The Framers provided a constitu-
tional framework that requires Congress to initiate hostilites, not sim-
ply act to override unilateral executive action through the use of the
funding power.20 2 Once hostilities are initiated, thousands of lives may
be lost and millions of dollars of economic damage may be incurred
198 ROBERTSON, FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA AND THE REVOLUTIONIZING OF
SPANISH AMERICA, H.R. Doc. No. 1282, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1909) (quoting
James Madison).
197 128 CONG. REC. H9158 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Bonoir).
19' See Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 16; see also Should the U.S.
Fight Secret Wars?, supra note 100, at 36 (remarks of Angelo Codevilla, staff member
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) (stating that the initiation of covert
action obfuscates the real issues and acts as a substitute for the formulation of a coher-
ent foreign policy); id. at 37 (remarks of Morton Halperin) (covert action commits the
United States to warfare without public debate).
199 See Halperin & Stone, Secrecy and Covert Intelligence Collection and Opera-
tions, in GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN AMERICA, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS 110-22 (N.
Dorsen & S. Gillers eds. 1974).
200 See Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 156; Borosage, The Central
Intelligence Agency: The King's Men and the Constitutional Order, in R. BOROSAGE
& J. MARKS, supra note 68, at 125; Katzenbach, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and
Secrecy, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 15 (1973).
201 See Congressional Oversight of Covert Activities: Hearings Before the House
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 34-35 (1983) (tes-
timony f William Colby, former Director of the CIA) [hereinafter Oversight Hear-
ings]; id. at 75-76 (testimony of Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency).
202 The War Powers Resolution specifically recognizes this framework and rejects
the executive's use of force except pursuant to congressional authorization or in re-
sponse to an attack upon the United States, its territories, or its armed forces. See 50
U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1982). If the War Powers resolution is read to permit the executive
to use force without congressional authorization, for a period not to exceed 60 days,
whenever she determines it to be necessary, the statute would be unconsitutional. See
id. § 1544(b).
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before Congress decides to cut off funds, which is precisely what the
constitutional requirement of congressional approval prior to initiation
of warfare was designed to prevent. Moreover, warfare, particularly
secret warfare, is difficult to end once initiated. 3 Thus, even though
the legitimacy of the covert action may become a matter of public de-
bate when funding decisions are made, therefore seeming to satisfy the
concern that these decisions be subject to the democratic decisonmaking
process, as a practical matter it may be very hard for Congress to end
them.20 4 Finally, the use of congressional funding power as an oversight
mechanism undercuts the secrecy rational that is used to support the
argument for executive control in this area. Since it is conceded that
these types of operations will eventually become public anyway, there
seems to be no logical reason for not allowing Congress to make the
initial decision, thereby truly serving the interests of democratic
decisionmaking.
Although the secrecy argument may be persuasive in the context of
intelligence activities or treaty negotiations, it is less so in the realm of
covert paramilitary operations. 205 The secrecy rationale admittedly may
203 Once a paramilitary operation is underway, "it is almost impossible to stop.
There is no real check or balance or after-thought a year after the operation has be-
gun." Oversight Hearings, supra note 201, at 23 (statement of Rep. Fowler); see also
id. at 139 (statement of Prof. William Miller, Former Staff Director of the Senate
Select Comm. on Intelligence) (stating that it is hard to end paramilitary operations
"once they start, even if there is a majority sentiment to do so").
204 Passage of appropriations. bills cannot be characterized as congressional ap-
proval for a particular paramilitary or military action. See War Powers Resolution, 50
U.S.C. § 1577 (a)(1); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that appropriation did consti-
tute congressional ratification). The War Powers Resolution was designed to explicitly
overturn the Orlando decision. See S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1973).
The nature of the appropriations process makes it difficult for Congress to cut off
funding for a particular operation, especially if there is disagreement between the Sen-
ate and the House. For example, in October of 1983 the House of Representatives
passed legislation which prohibited United States support for military or paramilitary
operations in Nicaragua. See H.R. 2968, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H8431
(daily ed. Oct. 20, 1983). The Senate, however, passed a bill which permitted the exec-
utive to spend $29 million for paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. See S. 1230, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S15,277 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1983). Because of the
nature of the appropriations process, had the House stood firm at conference, the con-
tras would have received $50 million under the terms of a continuing resolution. See
129 CONG. REC. H10,492 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Miller). Even
Representatives who firmly opposed any aide to the contras were, therefore, forced to
agree to the Senate bill. See id. at H10,478; see also Oversight Hearings, supra note
201, at 139 (testimony of Professor W. Miller, Former Staff Director of the Senate
Select Comm. on Intelligence) (stating that it required four years of successive legisla-
tive fund cutoffs before the Vietnam War could be ended).
205 The examples from early American history usually given to support executive
power over covert activities relate to intelligence gathering or executive diplomatic ini-
tiatives-not paramilitary warfare. See, e.g., President Polk's Message to Congress
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support executive control over the distribution of covert propaganda,
and does seem to mandate primary executive control over intelligence
gathering. Spying by its very nature must be kept secret-for an intelli-
gence mission to be successful, the foreign nation cannot be apprised of
the fact that there are spies in its midst.2"' Covert paramilitary warfare,
on the other hand, does not and cannot strive for itivisibility. The na-
tions of the world cannot be kept ignorant of the fact their neighbors
are at war.207 Perhaps it is the American role in a covert war that can
be concealed." 8 But this claim also fails to persuade: it is generally
conceded that United States participation in secret wars does not and
cannot remain hidden.20 " The United States role was not kept secret in
any of the paramilitary cases studied by the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities in 1976.210 Indeed, our handiwork has been
easily recognized in the 1954 overthrow of the Aibenez government of
Guatemala,21' the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961,212 and the
current contra attacks against the Sandinista government.213
Some commentators and administration officials have argued that
even if the activities of the United States are generally known, they
must still be officially denied, since the world community would not
sanction the American role and open acknowledgement would strain
relations with the Soviet Union or other nations.2 " But United States
(Apr. 20, 1846), reprinted in 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra
note 103, at 435 (discussing need for secrecy in employing individuals to obtain infor-
mation or aid in the negotiation of a treaty).
"I The executive branch has often relied on spies and private agents to conduct
United States foreign policy. See H. WRISTON, ExEcuTIvE AGENTS IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS 693-744 (1929).
207 See Pratt, Counterintelligence: Organization and Operational Security in the
1980's, in 3 INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980's: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
230-31 (R. Godson ed. 1980); see also Should the U.S. Fight Secret Wars?, supra note
100, at 35 (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan) (noting that there is no such
thing as a secret war); id. at 39 (statement of Ray Cline) (commenting that military
operations are simply impossible to fight secretly).
208 See Should the U.S. Fight Secret Wars?, supra note 100, at 39 (statement of
Ray Cline).
209 See Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 525 ("In the present situa-
tion, large-scale operations, such as the support of guerrilla forces, which can neither be
kept secret nor plausibly denied should not be undertaken covertly.").
210 See Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 155.
211 See id. at 111.
212 See id. at 120; see also P. WYDEN, supra note 64 (discussing the planning and
implementation of the Bay of Pigs operation by the CIA).
21 United States support of the Nicaraguan contras is not only recognized by the
Reagan administration, but has become a critical part of the president's agenda. See
The Contra Crusade, NEWSWEEK, March 17, 1986, at 20.
214 See Should the U.S. Fight Secret Wars?, supra note 100, at 39 (statement of
Ray Cline) (noting that the question is whether we "officially admit our responsibil-
ity"); id. at 45 (statement of Leslie Gelb) (noting that open aid to Afghan rebels would
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involvement in major paramilitary operations cannot be plausibly de-
nied,215 and it is not clear how official acknowledgement of such adven-
tures would seriously damage our dealings with other countries, once
our role has been revealed to them.216 It is unlikely that a public an-
nouncement of American aid to the Nicaraguan contras, or the Afghan,
Angolan, or Cambodian rebels, would make the Nicaraguan, Soviet,
Angolan, or Vietnamese governments unwilling to deal with us diplo-
matically. In fact, these nations all seek diplomatic negotiations with us,
despite the de facto open and public aid we have given to the rebels
opposing their central governments.217 Even if the plausible deniability
argument possessed logical force, it does not support unchecked execu-
tive authority, since Congress can and has authorized paramilitary ac-
tivity without officially publishing or announcing its authorization.21
strain relations with Soviet Union).
215 See Pratt, supra note 207, at 231 (stating that paramilitary operations spon-
sored by the United States are quickly attributed to us).
211 Since, for example, the Soviets openly aided one side in the Angolan war, our
reluctance to officially admit that we provide aid to certain groups is hard to under-
stand. See H. ROSITZKE, THE CIA's SECRET OPERATION: ESPIONAGE, COUNTERESPI-
ONAGE AND COVERT ACTION 182 (1977). Some argue that it is important to be able to
deny covert operations plausibly because it creates less friction with the countries af-
fected. For example, one purported reason that aid to the Afghan guerrillas must be
covert is that the government of Pakistan, which sympathizes with the guerrillas, ob-
jects to accepting aid overtly. See Should the U.S. Fight Secret Wars?, supra note 100,
at 45 (statement of Leslie Gelb). However, the precise means by which we aid the
Afghan rebels can still be denied, without our own role being entirely hidden, thereby
protecting Pakistan's secrecy interest.
Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, has scoffed at the
arguments that public denial of United States involvement in the Angolan civil war
serves United States interests. "We are playing games with ourselves. It is a contradic-
tion in terms. The president has talked about this, the press writes about it. To say that
we can deny we are doing it is a gross deception, it does not fool anybody." N.Y.
Times, Apr. 1, 1986, at 3, col. 4. A similar argument could be applied to virtually
every significant "covert" paramilitary operation, such as the Nicaraguan, Afghanis-
tani, or Cambodian programs. Hamilton has introduced legislation that "would require
that any United States government support for military or paramilitary operations in
Angola be the openly acknowledged and publicly debated policy of the United States,"
and that "any such assistance should not proceed unless the President publicly requests
such assistance and the Congress votes to provide assistance." H.R. Rep. No. 508, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). Hamilton stated that he did not "think it wise to proceed on
these highly controversial policy decisions without the support of the Congress. This is
not covert action in the ordinary sense of the term, this is a war." N.Y. Times, supra.
217 See N.Y. Times, June 19, 1985, at 16, col. 3 (Soviet and Afghan governments
willing to negotiate with the United States on the Afghan conflict); Crossette, Hanoi
Seems Split On Links With U.S., N.Y. Times, May 2, 1985, at 7, col. 1 (statements of
Le Duc Tho, Vietnamese Politburo member and Le Mai, Vietnamese Assistant Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs) (stating that the Vietnamese government is willing to talk about
Cambodia); N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1985, at 7, col. 1 (statement of Daniel Ortega, Presi-
dent of Nicaragua) (stating that he is "'always' ready to talk with Washington").
218 For example, Congress secretly authorized the use of military force in the
Floridas in 1811 and 1813. See Acts of Jan. 15, 1811, and Feb. 12, 1812, 3 Stat. 471,
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Because what is at issue is not secrecy, but official diplomatic
deniability, Congress could authorize the activity without publicly an-
nouncing or publishing its authorization, just as the executive does.
Covert paramilitary operations approved solely by the executive
are unwise, even if it were possible to keep them secret. If the use of
force is in conformity with international law, it should be openly un-
dertaken and publicly defended. Official denial of our involvement in
covert operations perpetuates the gap between stated norms and actual
practice, which renders international norms ineffective. 19 Given our
nation's widely publicized asserted interest in closing that gap in the
areas of human rights and terrorism,220 denial of our involvement in
paramilitary operations abroad can only be counterproductive.
Resort to the "plausible deniability" argument is based fundamen-
tally on the suspicion that our covert activities may violate international
law and that they would be difficult to defend against international and
domestic protest. Some commentators remain unperturbed by the
probability of international law violations, and argue that, at times, cer-
tain activities must be undertaken even if they are illegal.22 1 This argu-
ment fails for several reasons. First, as already noted, where United
States interests are so strong as to require a breach of international law,
472 (1818). Those statutes were not officially reported or promulgated until 1818, after
the crisis with Spain regarding the Floridas had past. See Act of March 3, 1811, 3 U.S.
Stat. 472 (1818) (prohibiting normal publication of the statute authorizing use of mili-
tary force in the Floridas).
While in today's world such a congressional vote could not be kept secret, it could
be officially denied in the same manner that the president "officially" denies covert
operations known to all. Cf N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1985, at Al, col. 2 (reporting Presi-
dent Reagan's public announcement of United States "covert" aid to the Nicaraguan
contras and administration approval of "covert" aid to the Angolan rebels).
219 See D'Amato, Nicaragua and International Law: The "Academic" and the
"Real," 79 AM. J. INT'L LAw 657 (1985) (discussing widening gap between stated
reasons for actions and actual reasons).
220 President Reagan has vehemently criticized terrorist activity and has called for
legislation setting up "a better domestic and international legal framework for dealing
with terrorism." Fighting Terrorism: Reagan Asks Lawyers to Help, 71 A.B.A. J. 17,
17 (Sept. 1985).
21 See Church Committee Report, supra note 65, at 9 ("We are facing an impla-
cable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at
whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human
conduct do not apply.") (quoting 1954 Hoover commission on government organiza-
tion); M. COPELAND, THE GAME OF NATIONS 10, 12 (1970) ("When we choose to
violate any of our policies, from being truthful in our diplomacy to refraining from
interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, we find means outside the nor-
mal machinery of government. Our government . . . is able to define a problem, to
release forces which, largely on their own power, can effect a solution, and to disclaim
any responsibility."); Braden, I'm Glad the CIA Is Immoral, THE SATURDAY EVE-
NING POST, May 20, 1967, at 10-14 (arguing that the CIA's financial support of stu-
dent and labor organizations abroad in the 1950's was necessary to prevent the KGB
from gaining ideological control of those groups).
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Congress, not the president alone, should make that determination. Sec-
ond, there are certain international norms that the nation should not be
able to breach even with congressional approval. Although United
States foreign policy needs may sometimes require breaking ordinary or
minor norms of international law, they can never necessitate the viola-
tion of international principles so fundamental as to constitute interna-
tional crimes,222 such as genocide 223 or aggression.224 Nevdrtheless, cer-
tain American paramilitary operations, such as those in Guatemala,
Cuba, and Nicaragua, do violate the core proscriptions of Article 2(4)
of the United Nations charter.
225
Moreover, the argument that resort to unlawful means interna-
tionally is necessary to protect our freedom at home presumes that do-
mestic liberty can be insulated from international lawlessness. Reliance
on unlawful means abroad requires the government to justify such ac-
tivities as necessary to combat "the enemy," usually seen as world com-
munism. Many United States government officials also perceive a tre-
mendous threat from the "enemy within," variously defined as
Communists, leftists, anarchists, peace demonstrators, student radicals,
civil rights activists, whole communities such as Latinos or blacks, or
sometimes, as in Watergate, politicians of the opposing party. Once un-
lawful means are considered justified to combat enemies abroad, it is
but a short psychological and political step to argue that the govern-
ment should take any steps necessary, even unlawful ones, to fight
against perceived enemies within. In sum, the perceived need to take
unlawful action to defend against a threat does not stop at the border.
Abiding by international law is thus inextricably connected to protect-
ing domestic liberties. 2
222 See Lobel, supra note 151, at 1134-38.
223 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
art. 1, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (1951) ("[Glenocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time
of war, is a crime under international law . . ").
224 See 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 171 (1947) (charging defendants with waging a war of aggres-
sion, and thus committing a crime against peace); Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, art. 6(a), Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 50 Stat. 1544, 1547, E.A.S. No. 472, at
14, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 ("planning, preparation, initiation or waging of 'a war of
aggression' is a crime against peace); J. APPELMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMES 22-28 (1954) (wars of aggression violate international law);
Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 61 (1947) ("[T]he
law of war . . . appl[ies] to interventions, invasions, aggressions, and other uses of
armed force in foreign territory even when there is no state of war.").
125 See G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp., (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doe. A/
9631 (1974); supra notes 177-78.
228 Falk, supra note 68, at 142-54 (neither possible nor desirable to separate for-
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Finally, modern international law is not a straitjacket. It is suffi-
ciently flexible to permit self-defense and a strong foreign policy that
can protect United States interests. Reliance on illegal methods in pur-
suit of our foreign policy undermines the very ends we are purportedly
trying to achieve.22 Recognizing that questionable means are being uti-
lized to realize our foreign policy goals should trigger a re-evaluation of
the ends actually being sought. If force and human rights violations are
deemed necessary to impose "democratic governments" on other coun-
tries, perhaps the aim of the policy is not democracy at all. If covert
activities, when uncovered, lead to widespread popular disapproval do-
mestically and internationally, we should not conceal them, but aban-
don them.
2. Private Armies and United States Troops
The argument for independent executive authority over the con-
duct of covert war relies, in part, on the historical expansion of execu-
tive power to commit United States troops abroad in the absence of a
declaration of war.22 Eugene Rostow has argued that "if it was per-
missible . . . for President Wilson to send troops into Mexico in order
to capture Pancho Villa-and it was-it is a fortiori legal for the
United States to . . .engage in foreign covert actions." '229 The debate
over executive power to introduce United States troops into combat is
far from over. It is likely that the rationale supporting the president's
inherent right to introduce troops to defend United States national se-
curity interests distorts our constitutional framework.230 If Rostow's ar-
guments were to prevail, the congressional power to declare war would
eign affairs from domestic society when it comes to the rule of law).
227 See Falk, supra note 68, at 142, 155-56 (stating that compliance with interna-
tional law furthers United States goals).
22 See House Intelligence Hearings, supra note 12, at 1732 (statement of Mitch-
ell Rogovin, Special Counsel to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) (stat-
ing that because the president has the power to use military force short of war, it
follows that he has power to send civilian personnel to foreign countries to engage in
covert action).
229 Letter from Eugene Rostow to the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Sept. 29, 1975), reprinted in
Military Hearings, supra note 13, at 160.
230 If the president can introduce troops into hostilities overseas, the difficulties of
withdrawing those troops as the situation becomes more intense can easily lead to a
circumvention of the congressional power to declare war. This is how we became in-
volved in the Vietnam War. See S. REP. No. 220, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973). To
regain its control over the involvement of American armed forces in foreign conflict,
Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution, which reiterated that the constitutional
authority to declare war rests with Congress rather than the president. See 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541-1548 (1982). Congress explicitly addressed the separation of powers doctrine
in describing the purposes of the War Powers Resolution. See id. at § 1541(a)-(c).
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become meaningless, because the executive can always assert some
vague national security interest to justify the commitment of American
troops. In any case, whatever the ultimate resolution of the president's
power to send United States troops into combat abroad, the utilization
of covert private armies presents a different constitutional problem.
First, the logical connection between executive authority over
United States troops and executive authority over covert paramilitary
operations is historically attenuated. Unilateral executive authority over
the use of American troops is premised on the gradual expansion of
that authority during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.23 During
that same period, however, private armies were outlawed and fell into
disuse in Europe and the United States.232 Thus, the expansion of ex-
ecutive control over United States troops does not mean that "it is a
fortiori legal for the United States to . . .engage in foreign covert ac-
tions,"2 3  because the use of public and private armies followed criti-
cally different historical paths.
The reason that private armies fell into disuse illustrates a second
historical flaw in Rostow's argument. The multilateral nineteenth cen-
tury prohibition against the use of private armies was a response to the
extreme difficulty governments had experienced in bringing private
armed forces under state control, and the tendency of those forces to
commit egregious violations of the laws of war and human rights. The
historical experience, therefore, demonstrates that the use of public ar-
mies does not provide a model for the use of paramilitary troops, but
rather that the use of private armies involves dangers other than those
attendant upon the use of regular troops. Thus, assuming arguendo
that executive authority over the commitment of United States troops
abroad is constitutional,. the potential for destruction and rampage by
private troops nevertheless requires that congressional authorization be
required for their use.
American diplomats and politicians from the time of the American
revolution recognized that private armed forces were an evil, necessary
only because of the weakness of the United States Navy and the unwill-
ingness of European nations to agree to strong protections for neutral
vessels.234 The American and European experience with letters of mar-
231 See Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. VA. L. REv. 53, 69-74 (1971);
Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U.L. REv. 19, 26-27 (1970).
232 See supra hiotes 55-57 and accompanying text.
233 Letter from Eugene Rostow to the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Sept. 29, 1975), reprinted in
Military Hearings, supra note 13, at 160.
234 As Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1785:
The United States, though better situated than any other nation to profit
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que and reprisal and privateers proved "that such forces, howsoever
commissioned, wrought grievous harm so long as they remained un-
checked by public control."23 The tendency of private bands to plunder
and massacre civilians led early presidents to deny aid even to private
groups whose aims conformed to United States foreign policy. For ex-
ample, although President Buchanan supported the aims of a private
expedition to take over Nicaragua in the 1850's, he nevertheless urged
that no aid be given:
It would be far better . . . for the Government itself to
get up such expeditions than to allow them to proceed under
the command of irresponsible adventurers. We could then, at
least, exercise some control over our own agents, and prevent
them from burning down cities and committing other acts of
enormity of which we have read.238
While partisan units attached to the regular army and under its direct
control were considered lawful in the mid-1800's, "guerrilla parties,
self-constituted sets of armed men . . .who form no integral part of
the organized army," were considered unlawful because of their ten-
dency to plunder and massacre.2 37 This was true even when such guer-
rilla units were authorized by the government.238
Recent history confirms the apprehensions of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Covert paramilitary actions have often involved
serious human rights abuses committed by our surrogates. 2 9 Although
by privateering, are so far as in them lies, endeavoring to abolish the prac-
tice by offering, in all their treaties with other powers, an article engaging
solemnly, that in case of a future war, no privateer shall be commissioned
on either side, and that unarmed merchant ships on both sides shall pur-
sue their voyages unmolested.
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to B. Vaughan, Esq., reprinted in H. WHEATON, His-
TORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 309 (Senior ed. 1973).
235 3 C. HYDE, supra note 90, at 390; see also J. KENT supra note 49, at 98
(stating that privateering is very liable to abuse); 7 J. MOORE, supra note 43, at 547
(stating that "privateering is attended with very great evils").
236 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 217 (1858) (Message of President
Buchanan to Congress).
117 See F. LIEBER, supra note 57, at 18-19.
238 Lieber implicitly assumed that the guerilla bands to which he referred may
have been covertly authorized or even paid by the government when he stated that these
bands "do not stand on the regular payroll of the army." Id.
239 See V. MARCHETrI & J. MARKS, supra note 64, at 245-46 (discussing the
abuses of the Phoenix program in Vietnam); Chamorro affidavit, supra note 92, at 20-
21 (stating that it is standard contra practice to kill prisoners and suspected Sandinista
collaborators); Banfman, The President's Secret Army: A Case Study-The CIA in
Laos 1962-1972, in R. BOROSAGE AND J. MARKS, supra note 68, at 46, 59; Church
Committee Report, supra note 65, at 255-84 (discussing various CIA assassination
plots).
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United States troops have also been accused of war crimes,240 Congress
has prescribed rules for the trial and conviction of soldiers who commit
such violations.24' The CIA and its paramilitary surrogates, however,
operate in the hazy underworld of international affairs. While Con-
gress has some control over the United States army, there is no Ameri-
can political institution that can control the abuses of foreign guerrillas
working for agents operating covertly.
The lack of United States control over surrogate armies also ren-
ders their operations exceedingly difficult to terminate, thereby exacer-
bating the dangers inherent in their use. The rationale behind the War
Powers Act is that American troops can be recalled after sixty days if
Congress does not approve of their use.24 2 Paramilitary forces, once in
the field, cannot be recalled as readily, because they are not subject to
direct United States governmental control.243
Covert paramilitary action is often justified as a less dangerous
and less costly alternative to the use of United States troops.244 While it
is certainly true that covert paramilitary actions initially do not result
in sizeable American casualties, they are similar to the dispatch of
American military advisors or small troop detachments in that they
240 See, e.g., United States v. Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534; 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973).
241 See Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 541-44. War crimes such as murder of noncom-
batants or prisoners may be prosecuted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-935 (1982). Although the Uniform Code does not refer specifi-
cally to war crimes, it provides for court-martial jurisdiction over crimes such as mur-
der, mayhem, and arson. See, e.g., id. at §§ 918-928; see also J. BISHOP, JUSTICE
UNDER FIRE 262 (1974) (pointing out that William Calley's case was not tried as a
war crime, but rather under the Uniform Code's premeditated murder provisions).
242 The War Powers Resolution provides that no later than 60 days after the
president has, pursuant to the statute, reported to Congress the deployment of U.S.
armed forces abroad, "the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed
Forces with respect to which such report was submitted," unless Congress specifically
authorizes the operation to continue or "is physically unable to meet as a result of an
armed attack upon the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982).
243 According to former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance:
Paramilitary operations are perhaps unique in that it is more difficult
to withdraw from them, once started, than covert operations. This is well
illustrated by the case of the Congo, where a decision was taken to with-
draw in early 1966, and it took about a year and a half before the opera-
tion was terminated. Once a paramilitary operation is commenced, the re-
cipient of the paramilitary aid tends to become dependent upon it and
inevitably advances the argument that to cut back or terminate the aid
would do the recipient great damage. This makes it especially difficult to
disengage.
Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 n.1 (1975).
2"4 DeWine, Instead Be Covert, N.Y. Times, April 23, 1986, at A23, col 2; Mc-
Farlane statement, supra note 100 (stating that covert action is desirable as an interme-
diate option between war and doing nothing).
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have a strong tendency to escalate into a larger American role involving
United States troops. 4 5 In addition, the extent, withdrawal, and aims
and methods of conducting paramilitary operations utilizing private
forces are extremely difficult to control. Thus, the lack of congressional
control over the actions of paramilitary forces underscores the need for
congressional control over the initiation of such operations.
3. Curbing the Dogs of War
Some critics have argued that a requirement that any resort to
paramilitary activity be congressionally authorized would render
paramilitary activities extremely difficult to achieve.246 These critics are
exactly right: the Framers purposely constructed the- Constitution in
such a way that it would be extremely difficult for the United States to
undertake armed conflict. The constitutional commitment of the power
to declare war to Congress was not premised solely on the perceived
value of democratic decisionmaking and open debate that the legislature
alone could provide; it also represented a substantive judgment on the
part of the Framers that entry into war should be difficult.247 James
Madison spoke of war as "among the greatest of national calami-
ties,"248 Thomas Jefferson desired an "effectual check to the Dog of
War,"249 and James Wilson argued that the Constitution was designed
not to "hurry us into war. '2 50 The constitutional framework thus con-
245 See Oversight Hearings, supra note 201, at 39, 42 (remarks of Reps. Fowler
and Boland); see also infra note 263 and accompanying text.
246 See, e.g., id. at 30 (testimony of William Colby, Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and General Larkin, President of the Association of Former Intelligence
Officers) (arguing that legislation requiring congressional approval of paramilitary op-
erations creates too many impediments for the administration or the CIA to overcome).
The need for speedy decisionmaking is another justification for executive authori-
zation of paramilitary activities. See id. at 31 (testimony of William Colby, Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency). Paramilitary action does not generally require rapid
decisionmaking, however. The many difficulties inherent in either organizing or simply
aiding a paramilitary operation dictates long-range planning, not immediate emergency
action. According to one of the original members of the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, "these things have long fuses." Id. (remarks of Rep. Fowler).
247 See Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 36, 82
(1972) (stating that the Framers' aversion to war influenced their decision to split war-
making powers); Friedman, Waging War Against Checks and Balances-The Claim
of an Unlimited Presidential War Power, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 213, 218-20 (1983)
(stating that Framers' attitude toward war manifests an unequivocal revulsion);
Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55
VA. L. REV. 1243, 1284 (1969) (stating that Constitution represents scheme in which
war would be entered only after measured deliberation).
248 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 316.
249 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at 397.
250 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 528; see also id. at 319
(statement of Rep. Ellsworth) (arguing that "it should be more easy [sic] to get out of
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tains a structural mechanism to ensure that force be used only to
counter serious threats to national security.251 That substantive judg-
ment is equally compelling in today's world, in which war is far more
destructive and calamitous than it was in 1787.
The desire to curb the "dogs of war" is also reflected in the Fram-
ers' explicit assignment of the authority to issue letters of marque and
reprisal to Congress. While recognizing that a letter of marque or re-
prisal could be used as a peacekeeping device,252 the Framers followed
the approach of English and Continental writers who saw that the issu-
ance of such letters was often a form of "imperfect," or limited, warfare
that either took the place of or led to declared war.253 Some legislators
hesitated to authorize them precisely because "the peace of the country
would be placed at [the] disposal [of armed merchants]."254
Joseph Story noted that the power to issue letters of marque and
reprisal was "plainly derived from that of making war," being "an in-
complete state of hostilities," often ultimately leading to a formal decla-
ration of war.15 Albert Gallatin argued that the grant of letters of
marque were "an intermediate state between peace and war,"2 ' and
generally preceded war, "[wihen it has not been thought proper to
come to open war at once."'2 57 Henry Clay observed, "[Rieprisals do
war, than into it"); id. at 319 (statement of Rep. Mason) (stating that Congress should
be "clogging rather than facilitating war").
25 James Wilson, a participant at the Constitutional Convention, noted:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it.
It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to
involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is
vested in the legislature at large . . . [F]rom this circumstance we may
draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our national interest can draw
us into a war.
Id.
252 3 J. STORY, supra note 54, at 63.
25' Blackstone noted that the "prerogative of granting [letters of marque and re-
prisal] is nearly related to, and plainly derived from, that other of making war: this
being indeed only an incomplete state of hostilities, and generally ending in a formal
declaration of war." W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at 250.
2" 7 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 82, at 254 (remarks of Rep. Livingston); see
also id. at 255 (remarks of Rep. Swanwick) (stating that "it would be very difficult to
regulate a power of this kind, since private interest were set to work to evade the law").
Albert Gallatin, the leader of the House Republicans, argued that the modern practice
of nations was for governments to fight wars, not private parties, and that the granting
of "letters of marque and reprisal," which generally led to war, was the only exception.
Id. at 256.
"1 3 J. STORY, supra note 54, at 64. Similarly, Kent stated that "geperal repri-
sals are equivalent to open war, but special letters of marque and reprisal, are a species
of hostility; and imperfect war, and usually a prelude to open hostilities." J. KENT,
supra note 49, at 62.
256 8 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 40, at 1511.
257 Id. Similarly, in 1835, Gallatin wrote, "[Alt present, general letters of marque
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not themselves produce a state of public war; but they are not unfre-
quently the immediate precursor of it."2" Because reprisals, even if
they are not public war, "partake of the character of war ... the
Framers of our Constitution. . .associat[ed] it in the same clause with
grants to Congress of the power to declare war . . "259 Thomas Jef-
ferson noted, "The making [of] a reprisal on a nation [was] a very
serious thing," often leading to war; therefore, "the right of reprisal [is]
expressly lodged with [Congress] by the Constitution and not with the
Executive."2 o
The Framers knew that if they did not give the power to issue
letters of marque and reprisal to Congress, congressional control over
the initiation of war could be easily eviscerated by executive-controlled
paramilitary exercises leading ultimately to war.261 Today, through
unilateral use of covert paramilitary operations, the president can easily
reverse the constitutional presumption, thereby facilitating our involve-
ment in actual (or de facto) war. The first step toward our involvement
in Vietnam was the secret dispatch of United States advisors to accom-
pany foreign armed forces. 26 2 Similarly, many view our current support
of the Nicaraguan contras as a prelude to the introduction of United
States armed forces and ultimately to war. Without directly violating
the letter of the congressional power to declare war or the War Powers
Act, the president can independently involve the nation in large-scale
military engagements contrary to its will through the use of paramili-
tary operatives. If the marque and reprisal clause is recognized as a
check on the authority of the president to involve the nation in covert
war, however, the Constitution does provide an effective obstacle to this
type of executive adventurism.
Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
Congress, the judiciary, and the executive agreed that the responsibility
for the initiation of private warfare was a congressional power. Con-
temporary arguments against congressional control-the president's
foreign affairs power and the need for secrecy-are too tenuous and
unpersuasive to justify reworking the Framers' original scheme. The
and reprisal are war to all intents and purposes; that they are never granted but in
consequence of an existing war, or as a way of making war without a formal declara-
tion." Letter from Mr. Gallatin to Mr. Everett (Jan. 5, 1835), reprinted in J. MOORE,
supra note 43, at 122.
2" See S. Doc. No. 40, 23d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1835), reprinted in 7 J. MOORE,
supra note 43, at 126 (Report of Henry Clay, Committee on Foreign Relations).
259 Id. at 127.
260 Op. Sec'y of State (May 16, 1793) (Thomas Jefferson), reprinted in id. at 123
(emphasis added).
261 See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
262 See S. REP. No. 220, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973).
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policies that informed the Framers' decision two hundred years
ago-the desire to avoid warfare and to minimize the plunder and dev-
astation of which private parties are uniquely capable-are equally
compelling today and buttress the historical and doctrinal justifications
for restricting the authorization of covert war to Congress.
The Framers' decision to grant authority over the use of force to
the congressional branch, therefore, represents not only a concern with
democratic process, but also a substantive judgment that any national
resort to force should be difficult to achieve. This constitutional judg-
ment is consistent with the United Nations charter, which rejects the
unilateral use of force by one nation except in very limited circum-
stances.263 Although in many cases humanitarian, democratic, or other
compelling concerns might justify resort to force, international law rec-
ognizes that such needs are outweighed by the dangers of unilateral
decisionmaking. 2 4 Fears of pretextual or nonessential uses of force led
both the Framers of the Constitution and the drafters of the United
Nations charter to choose collective over individual decisionmaking
whenever armed force was involved. With the breakdown of the United
Nations' collective decisionmaking process, the necessity for upholding
our own structural safeguards becomes even more urgent.
Of course, exceptional cases, in which secrecy needs, humanitarian
concerns, and our national interest are so strong that unilateral presi-
dential decisionmaking is required, may arise. For example, one can
posit a situation in which United States intelligence agencies are in-
formed that the leader of a foreign country is planning to commit geno-
cide against a portion of that nation's citizens, and that a powerful op-
position leader in that country is willing to initiate an armed coup if
American covert aid is provided, but only if that aid is provided
secretly.
Any reworking of the constitutional framework to allow for un-
checked emergency powers in the executive is unwise, however, because
it would inevitably lead to vast assertions of executive power unjustified
by actual emergencies. As Justice Jackson noted, "[Elmergency pow-
ers . . . tend to kindle emergencies. '265 Instead, the president must be
263 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
28 See Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIvIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 219 (J. Moore ed. 1974); R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT
WORLD 339 (1968); Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 645, 649 (1984). But see Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian
Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIvIL WAR, supra,
at 230 (arguing that the "abject inability" of the United Nations to stop human rights
violations necessitates unilateral humanitarian intervention by individual countries).
265 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson,
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obliged to react to emergency situations in a manner that complies with
existing constitutional constraints. These constraints are not seriously
respected by the imposition of vague requirements that the president act
in the "national interest," or even that the situation be important or
even essential to national security.2 66 Rather, the president must make
any decision that violates the Constitution with the knowledge that by
acting unilaterally she is acting unconstitutionally. Then, only the most
extreme humanitarian and national security concerns could possibly
provide justification for unconstitutional actions.
The recognition that such an unconstitutional action would render
the executive vulnerable to impeachment proceedings should Congress
or the public disapprove of her actions would assure that the president
would act in violation of the Constitution only if the situation were
extreme.2 7 Of course, such a rule might lead a risk-averse president to
J., concurring).
268 Attempts to curtail presidential abuse of power by requiring that a high, but
ill-defined, standard be met before certain authority may be invoked have generally
failed. For example, the International Economic Emergencies Power Act (IEEPA) lim-
its presidential power to situations presenting an "unusual and extraordinary threat
• . . to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States." 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (1982). Despite that strong language, the Reagan administration has
continued to use IEEPA power not to meet "unusual and extraordinary threats," but
as simply another tool of American foreign policy. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,513,
50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985) (declaring trade embargo against Nicaragua). The sponsor
and main driving force behind IEEPA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, has noted
that nobody drafting the statute "dreamed a President would so distort the meaning of
the words 'national emergency' and 'threat to national security' as to apply them to the
. . . situation in Nicaragua today." N.Y. Times, May 12, 1985, at 22, col. 3 (letter to
the editor). Furthermore, this order is probably not subject to judicial review because
the courts have held that whether the president has met the statutory standard for
invoking emergency powers presents a nonjusticiable political question. See Beacon
Products v. Reagan, No. 85-2335-G, slip op. at 7 (D. Mass. Apr. 28, 1986).
2. As President Lincoln noted when he claimed unprecedented emergency power
during the Civil War, "I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become
lawful, by becoming indispensible to the preservation of the Constitution, through the
preservation of the nation." 10 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 65-66 (J.
Nicolay & J. Harp eds. 1894). Lincoln then submitted his actions to Congress for
ratification. See President Lincoln's Message to Congress in Special Session, July 14,
1861, reprinted in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 103, at
20-31 (J. Richardson ed. 1898). Covert paramilitary action, undertaken because of an
asserted emergency, would not-unlike Lincoln's actions-generally be submitted to
Congress for ratification. The lack of effective congressional oversight for genuine
emergency actions requiring secrecy underscores the problem with creating a "national
security" or emergency exception to the constitutional principle.
The Church Committee, in proposing an absolute ban in the case of assassination,
recognized the argument that there might be a truly national emergency, such as a
threat posed by Adolf Hitler, where assassination might not be absolutely ruled out.
Yet the committee recognized also that it would be better to rule out assassinations
entirely, bringing any presidential authorization of such action into conflict with the
law, thereby ensuring that only where such an action represented an "indispensable
necessity" to the life of the nation would the president take such action. See THE IN-
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forego a course of action actually in the national interest. The dangers
of excess caution, however, are far outweighed by the dangers of pre-
cipitous entry into public or private warfare. Balancing the risks, the
Framers wisely chose the former.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT EFFORTS: PARAMILITARY ACTIONS
AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
This Article has argued that the Constitution requires that
paramilitary activities abroad be undertaken only with congressional
authorization pursuant to the marque and reprisal clause. The Intelli-
gence Authorization Act of 1981,268 however, seems to permit the exec-
utive to conduct covert operations without congressional approval.269
Under the Act, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is
required to give the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelli-
gence prior notice of significant intelligence operations abroad, includ-
ing CIA covert operations.2"' In extraordinary circumstances, however,
the president may dispense with this prior notice requirement, although
she must make a subsequent report to the leadership of each committee
and explain why prior notice was not given.2
On its face, the Act seems to delegate congressional authority over
paramilitary operations to the president. The Act, however, should not
be read this broadly, but should be understood as a supplement to pre-
existing statutory or constitutional limits on the executive use of covert
operations. The purpose of the statute was to provide procedural limi-
tations on the exercise of executive power in order to augment the sub-
stantive restraints that already existed. The statute states that its proce-
dural mechanism applies only "to the extent consistent with all
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, supra note 14, at 810.
268 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982).
269 While the National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, ch. 343, 61
Stat. 495 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, and 50 U.S.C.),
which established the CIA, was seen as authorizing covert action, doubt persisted until
the passage of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (the predecessor of the Intelligence Au-
thorization Act of 1981), which clearly authorized covert operations. See 22 U.S.C.
§ 2422 (a) (1982).
217 See 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1982) (the committees must be kept "fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities which are the responsibility of, are en-
gaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of ... the United States"); see also S.
REP. No. 730, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4194-95 (requiring that each CIA covert operation be classified as a "signif-
icant anticipated intelligence activity" and be reported in advance to both the Senate
and House intelligence committees).
2171 See 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)-(b) (1982).
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applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred by the Con-
stitution upon the executive and legislative branches of the Govern-
ment." 27 2 The Senate report indicated clearly that the notice procedures
were not "intended to expand or to contract or to define whatever may
be the applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred by
the Constitution upon the Executive and Legislative branches."
273
Thus, Congress, in passing this statute, intended neither to repeal the
Neutrality Act's limitations on executive actions,274 nor to transfer its
own constitutional war powers to the president.27 5 More generally, the
Act did not create any new power in the president, but merely created
procedures by which preexisting executive power could be more effec-
tively and openly exercised.
If the Act does authorize the president to initiate covert paramili-
tary operations without congressional approval, it is an unconstitutional
delegation of congressional power.2 7' Authorizing the president to un-
dertake paramilitary operations any time she determines that they are
"important to the national security of the United States,"2 77 without
any kind of meaningful oversight, would be a wholesale transfer to the
president of the congressional authority to issue letters of marque and
reprisal. Congress can no more delegate its marque and reprisal power
than it can enact a statute permitting the president to declare war on a
foreign country whenever she deems it in the national interest to do
so. 278 In the words of Justice Cardozo, this would be "delegation run-
ning riot.' 279 Although the Supreme Court has not invalidated a statute
272 Id. at § 413(a).
273 S. REP. No. 659, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4182, 4196.
174 See Lobel, supra note 22, at 59-60.
275 See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
276 The potential delegation of powers problem is in one sense quite obvious: on
its face, the Constitution vests in Congress alone the power to declare war. See High-
smith, supra note 13, at 327. As Professor Berger argued: "That the fact of the Consti-
tution clearly evidences a severely limited allocation of war power to the President
seems to me beyond dispute; it shuts off the President from waging a war not 'begun'
or 'authorized' by Congress." Berger, War, Foreign Affairs, and Executive Secrecy, 72
Nw. U.L. REV. 309, 320 (1977).
2"7 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982). The CIA may expend no funds for operations
abroad beyond pure intelligence gathering unless the president finds such an operation
to be important to the national security of the United States. Id.
278 See M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 191 (2d ed. 1969) ("[I]t would be
unthinkable for someone other than Congress . . .to be able to plunge the nation into
a declared war.").
2179 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935).
One indication of just how broad a delegation of the marque and reprisal clause
could be is illustrated by the debate that surrounded the Johnson administration's inter-
pretation of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. See L. VELVEL, UNDECLARED WAR AND
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 75-89 (1970) (stating that the Johnson administration's claim
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on the ground of improper delegation in fifty years, 80 and some schol-
ars and judges believe the nondelegation doctrine to be moribund,"' the
Court has recently read Acts of Congress narrowly in order to avoid
delegation problems, thus suggesting a possible revitalization of the
doctrine.
2 82
Notwithstanding a renewed judicial sensitivity to problems of con-
gressional delegation, it is clear that many congressional powers may be
confidently delegated.28 3 A means of distinguishing the powers that can
that the Resolution authorized the introduction of troops into Vietnam would mean
that it was an unconstitutional delegation to the president of the power to declare war);
Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 623,
691-99 (1972) (arguing that the Resolution did not give the president the right to land
troops "in a zone of war so that he might repel armed attack against them"); Bickel,
Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 131,
137-38 (1971) (stating that in passing the Resolution "Congress intended to approve
presidential reactions commensurate with [the Gulf of Tonkin) incident . . . and not
necessarily an undertaking the magnitude of the Vietnam . . . war"). That Resolution
limited the president to "tak[ing] all necessary steps, including the use of armed force,
to assist any . . . member of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting
assistance." Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384, 384 (1964).
The president was therefore limited to using force only in a particular region, and only
under circumstances where another state had requested aid.
In contrast, the Intelligence Authorization Act, read broadly, authorizes the presi-
dent to undertake paramilitary operations any time she determines that they are "im-
portant to the national security of the United States." 22 U.S.C. § 2422. This broad
delegation is even more dangerous than the arguably unconstitutional delegation in the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and should therefore be more vigorously contested.
280 The last and only such cases were Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935), and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
281 See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345,
353 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that the nondelegation doctrine "is
surely as moribund as the substantive due process approach of the same era"); K. DA-
vIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.01 (1958).
282 See Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-
46 (1980); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342,(1974);
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958). As Justice Rehnquist points out, "[A] num-
ber of observers have suggested that this Court should once more take up its burden of
ensuring that Congress does not unnecessarily delegate important choices of social pol-
icy to politically unresponsive administrators." Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at
686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). While decisions of the Court have not yet resurrected
the nondelegation doctrine from the doctrinal graveyard, in the past decade the Court
has "gone out of its way to indicate that the old law on delegation may not be entirely
passe." B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.11 (2d ed. 1984).
Few would call for a rehabilitation of broad nondelegation formulations such as
that in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("[Tlhat congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.").
Several recent commentators, however, advocate revitalizing more limited nondelegation
principles. See, e.g., S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CON-
GRESSIONAL POWER 11-51 (1975); Note, Rethinking the Nondelegation Doctrine, 62
B.U.L. REV. 257, 282-86 (1982); Wright, Book Review, Beyond Discretionary Justice,
81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972).
282 See K. DAVIS, supra note 281, § 3.1-3. Davis maintains that, despite renewed
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be delegated from those that cannot must be found. In 1825, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall argued, "[Tlhose important subjects, which must be en-
tirely regulated by the legislature itself, [are to be distinguished] from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and
power given to those who are to act under such general provisions, to
fill up the details."2 4
Although Marshall recognized that the line between "important
subjects" and those of "less interest" could not be precisely drawn, it is
clear that delegating decisions to go to war or engage in paramilitary
hostilities are qualitatively different from congressional delegations con-
cerning particular OSHA standards, 85 tariff duties,2"8 or acceptable
levels of air pollution.287 Congress may not have the time, technical
expertise, or desire to make the myriad administrative decisions neces-
sary in the contemporary administrative state, but Congress can and
should decide whether to go to war or authorize war-making by others
for whom we are responsible under international law.28 ' The concerns
raised by the delegation of important policy determinations to adminis-
trative agencies in the enforcement of regulatory statutes pale in com-
parison to those raised by broad delegations of congressional power
over war and peace.
A more useful method for separating those congressional powers
that may be constitutionally delegated from those that may not is to
focus on two interrelated fundamental principles that underlie the
nondelegation doctrine. First, important issues of public policy should
be decided by a broadly representative deliberative body.289 Second, the
interest in the nondelegation doctrine, the view that "Congress may delegate legislative
power to agencies as it chooses ... is likely to continue as the central" view of courts
and lawmakers. Id. See, e.g., Federal Power Corm'n, 415 U.S. at 353; Sunshine An-
thracite Coal v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) ("Delegation by Congress has long
been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not
become a futility.").
284 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
285 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. 607 (testing the validity of a stat-
ute allowing the Secretary of Labor to promulgate health standards after making a
finding that significant risks are present).
288 See, e.g., J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)
'(upholding a delegation to the president to establish and adjust customs duties on im-
ported merchandise because of the difficulty of gathering data).
287 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding statute giving broad discretion to the EPA to implement
policies of the Clean Air Act).
288 See L. VELVEL, supra note 279, at 83-84.
288 See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 160-61 (1962); J. FREED-
MAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 80 (1978); Wright, supra note 282, at 585; see also Industrial Union
Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine insures that important decisions are
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constitutional framework can only be changed by the amendment pro-
cess, not by a single legislative act;290 statutes that delegate constitution--
ally assigned congressional power to another branch of government
substitute a particular legislature's will for that of the Framers and
thus rework the constitutional arrangement." 1 If the function of the
nondelegation doctrine is to ensure constitutional supremacy and demo-
cratic decisionmaking, any application of the doctrine must determine
whether the power to be delegated was specifically given to Congress to
prevent the executive from making independent decisions in that
area.
292
The key inquiry, therefore, is not the importance of the power, or
whether it is a "core legislative function," '93 but whether the power
was granted to the legislative branch because of the Framers' fear or
distrust of nondemocratic decisionmaking by another branch. By dele-
gating a decision of this kind, Congress would be giving another branch
made by "the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will"); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 277 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that im-
proper delegation transfers policymaking function to agencies not responsive in same
degree to the people); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that nondelegation doctrine ensures that "fundamental policy deci-
sions ...will be made not by an appointed official but by the body immediately re-
sponsible to the people").
290 See S. BARBER, supra note 282, at 36-38; Freedman, Book Review, Delega-
tion of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CH. L. REV. 307, 315-16 (1976).
291 See S. BARBER, supra note 282, at 37. Other scholars and courts locate the
values implicit in the nondelegation doctrine in due process or separation of powers
concepts or in the need to allow the courts to exercise judicial review properly. For
separation of powers rationales, see J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 405-06 (1928); W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
50-52 (7th ed. 1979). For due process arguments, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 3.15 (1976); Cushman, The Constitutional Status of the
Independent Regulatory Commissions, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 13, 32-33 (1938). Argu-
ments based on the need for judicial review are expressed in Industrial Union Dep't,
448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
While these other values are certainly furthered by the nondelegation doctrine,
they are not the most important justifications for the doctrine. See S. BARBER, supra
note 282, at 36-37. Barber suggests that the fundamental rationale for the doctrine lies
in the principle of constitutional supremacy. Moreover, the values of due process and
judicial review are relevant to administrative law concerns, but not to the delegation of
authority over foreign affairs.
292 Professor Freedman has suggested a similar test, arguing that the Court ought
to determine "whether a particular legislative power is one that Congress may not
delegate." Freedman, supra note 290, at 326. That inquiry must address "the nature of
the particular power involved and the intended relationship of that power to the struc-
ture of our constitutional scheme." Id. Freedman concludes that where "the Framers
regarded the proper exercise of a specific legislative power as closely dependent upon
the unique institutional competence of Congress, the nondelegation doctrine would pro-
hibit Congress from delegating that power to another." Id. at 336.
29 For a rejection of the "core function" analysis, see Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374, 1385-86 (D.D.C. 1986).
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of government power that the Framers had specifically determined that
branch must not have. Although most delegations would be upheld
under this standard, there are certain congressional powers that are
nondelegable.294 Broad delegation of the powers to declare war or issue
letters of marque and reprisal would alter the original constitutional
balance of power, and provide the executive with power the Framers
feared and sought to deny. Delegating authority over the use of
paramilitary forces thus highlights the concerns of many scholars who
urge a revitalization of the nondelegation doctrine.295
The Supreme Court seemed to follow the suggested approach in
National Cable Television Association v. United States.298 The Na-
tional Cable Court construed the fee-setting authority of federal agen-
cies narrowly in order to avoid a finding of an unconstitutional delega-
tion of the taxing power.297 Since the statutory standards involved in
National Cable were not qualitatively different from those that the
Court had upheld without much difficulty in prior cases,298 the alleged
vice of the statute must have been its possible intrusion on the taxing
power. The Court's reference to Chief Justice Marshall's famous ob-
servation that the power to tax is the power to destroy299 suggests that
the National Cable Court viewed the taxing power as particularly sus-
ceptible to oppressive application and abuse. Writing for the majority,
Justice Douglas noted, "Taxation is a legislative function, and Con-
gress ...is the sole organ for levying taxes ... ."3oo The Framers
recognized the taxing power's importance and potential for abuse, and
thus entrusted it to the House of Representatives, the most broadly rep-
resentative branch of government. For similar structural reasons, one
commentator has argued that the impeachment power should be non-
294 See M. FORKOSCH, supra note 278, at 191 (differentiating certain "particular-
ized inabilities to delegate" from the general nondelegation doctrine); Freedman, supra
note 290, at 336 (suggesting that the traditional nondelegation doctrine should be re-
constructed to reflect the nature of the particular power being delegated and the charac-
ter of the institution chosen to exercise it).
295 See, e.g., S. BARBER, supra note 282, at 1-6; Freedman supra note 290, at
335-36.
298 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
217 See id. at 340-43. The taxing power is entrusted to Congress by U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
989 See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 787 (1948) (upholding Rene-
gotiation Act as constitutional delegation of congressional authority); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (upholding a delegation pursuant to the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 as constitutional because the standards set "are sufficiently
definite and precise").
299 415 U.S. at 341 n.4 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819)).
300 Id. at 340.
19861 1099
1100 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
delegable., 01 According to Alexander Hamilton, the power to impeach
was assigned to Congress because the drastic public consequences of the
impeachment of public officers "forbid[ ] the commitment of the trust
to a small number of persons." °2
The powers over the initiation of war or the authorization of pri-
vate persons to engage in warfare under letters of marque and reprisal
raise the same structural concerns as the taxing power. Even more
clearly than the taxing power, the war power is the power to destroy,
and the constitutional grant of the war power to Congress reflects the
Framers' recognition of that destructive power. As Joseph Story recog-
nized, the "nature and effects" of war are "so critical and calamitous,
that it requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all
the councils of the nation."3 03 The Framers wanted to keep the power
to initiate hostilities away from the president, because they believed
that the executive was more likely to involve the country in the calam-
ity of war than was Congress. 04 As James Madison noted, "War is in
fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement."3 0 5 Abraham Lincoln
301 See Freedman, supra note 290, at 326-27.
802 THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 335 (M. Beloff ed. 1948).
o 2 J. STORY, supra note 54, at 60; see also L. VELVEL, supra note 279, at 11-
12 (quoting Story with approval).
3o In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton related that, with respect to the power to
make treaties, history
does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make
it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a
kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to
the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a
president of the United States.
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 383-84 (M. Beloff ed. 1948); see also A. SOFAER, supra
note 5, at 51-52 (emphasizing Congress's role in checking executive command of the
army and navy).
305 Madison, Helvidius No. 4, in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note
105, at 174. Madison wrote:
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the
clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and
not to the executive department. Beside the objection to such a mixture of
heterogeneous power, the trust and the temptation would be too great for
any one man; not such as nature may offer as the prodigy of many centu-
ries, but such as may be expected in the ordinary successions of magis-
tracy. War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war, a
physical force is to be created; and it is the executive will, which is to
direct it. In war, the public treasures are to be unlocked; and it is the
executive hand which is to dispense them. In war, the honours and emolu-
ments of office are to be multiplied; and it is executive patronage under
which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that laurels are to be
gathered; and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest
passions and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambition,
avarice, vanity, the honourable or venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy
against the desire and duty of peace.
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later argued that the constitutional "convention understood [war] to be
the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so
frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power for
bringing this oppression upon us. ' '
Because the power to declare war and issue letters of marque and
reprisal are important subjects, 307 and were placed in the hands of
Congress specifically to ensure democratic decisionmaking and preclude
the independent exertion of executive power in the area of martial con-
flict, it appears that Congress cannot constitutionally delegate its power
to issue letters of marque and reprisal to the president. The reason that
the Framers granted Congress the power to declare war and issue let-
ters of marque and reprisal was to make it difficult for the United
States to engage in war through the use of regular troops or private
citizens. The purpose of delegation is to make government run more
efficiently and to facilitate decisionmaking. Where the Framers deter-
mined that a decision should not be facilitated, but rather slowed down
so that the federal government would find it difficult to undertake cer-
tain activities, any congressional delegation in that area must be closely
scrutinized. If the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1981 is read to al-
low the president to authorize paramilitary adventures without congres-
sional check, it is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court seemed to hold otherwise in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation,308 when it found that Congress
"must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom
from statutory restriction [in foreign affairs] which would not be admis-
sible were domestic affairs alone involved." 309 The opinion affirms
broad congressional delegation in foreign policy matters, 1 0 and suggests
that virtually any congressional delegation in matters of foreign affairs
will be held constitutional. Although Curtiss-Wright may seem to sanc-
tion a congressional delegation to the president of the marque and re-
prisal powers through the Intelligence Authorization Act, closer exami-
nation reveals that Curtiss-Wright is consistent with the position that
such a delegation would be impermissible.
Id.
308 E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 497 n.7 (5th rev. ed.
1984) (quoting Abraham Lincoln).
307 See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
.08 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
309 Id. at 320.
310 See Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Histori-
cal Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 5 n.25 (1973) (listing commentators who argue that
this is the only relevant holding of Curtiss-Wright, and that the opinion's language
going beyond foreign affairs delegation is dicta).
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The Curtiss-Wright delegation was upheld precisely because of the
executive's residual authority over the transactions involved in that
case.3 1 Justice Sutherland's dicta stating that the president is the "sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions," 312 reflected his view that the president had some concurrent au-
thority with Congress over the subject sought to be regulated. 1 ' Justice
Sutherland viewed one branch's authority as dependent on the nature
of the power exercised by the other branch of government. Under his
view, when the president has some authority in an area, Congress has a
greater ability to delegate because it is merely expanding that already
existing authority. Thus, although in Curtiss-Wright the president's
general foreign affairs power would not have been sufficient to author-
ize him to act independently of congressional authorization, 3 4 because
he had some power Congress was able to delegate broad authority in a
manner that would have been impermissable if he had had no power
over the area. Following this interpretation of Curtiss-Wright, subse-
quent broad delegations of authority to the president in foreign affairs
have been upheld, "because of the delegatee's residual authority over
particular subjects of regulation." ' 5 Where, however, the president is
explicitly precluded from exercising authority over particular areas,
Congress cannot delegate that broad authority to her. Unlike general
foreign policy determinations, decisions to go to war, to issue letters of
marque or reprisal, or to authorize private invasions of another country
are not decisions over which the executive has concurrent authority
with Congress. Even under Justice Sutherland's analysis, therefore,
Congress cannot delegate these powers to the president.31 6
311 See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum, 448 U.S. 607, 684 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
312 299 U.S. at 320.
313 This interpretation of Curtiss-Wright rejects the polar positions that Suther-
land's statements as to executive power over foreign affairs are either irrelevant dicta or
a grant of plenary power over various foreign affairs decisions to the president. See
Lofgren, supra note 310, at 1, 3-4, 5 n.25. Read properly, Sutherland's view affirms
broad congressional delegations of authority where the executive has some independent
authority.
314 See L. HENKIN, supra note 159, at 340 n.9 (stating that the president could
not have prosecuted violators of the arms embargo at issue in Curtiss-Wright absent
statutory authority).
"I Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 684 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 422 (1935) (describing delegation of
authority to president as "cognate to the conduct by him of the foreign relations of the
Government"); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109-10
(1948) ("The President . . . possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by
the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ in foreign
affairs.").
'16 The Curtiss-Wright Court's treatment of the validity of the congressional dele-
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A distinction analogous to that discussed in the text has been rec-
ognized in the treaty context. While Congress has the power to regulate
foreign commerce or dispose of United States property, such congres-
sional power does not preclude self-executing treaties addressing the
same subjects.3 17 Many commercial treaties with other nations are self-
executing. 18 A treaty may delegate to the president powers she might
not otherwise have, such as the power to extradite a citizen to a foreign
country.31 9
Despite agreement that the treaty power may authorize the presi-
dent to act in areas which are normally the preserve of Congress, sev-
eral exceptions are generally recognized. In particular, it is widely be-
lieved that "an international agreement cannot itself bring the United
States into a state of war. ' 320 Yet the "power of Congress to declare
war is not characterized or designated in any way that would distin-
gation to the president of part of its foreign affairs power is consistent with Justice
Jackson's famous analysis of presidential power vis-a-vis the power of Congress in the
Steel Seizure Case. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). "Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, de-
pending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." Id. at 635.
Justice Jackson identified three kinds of executive actions:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate . . .. 2.
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or de-
nial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain . . . In this area, any
actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events ....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb ....
Id. at 635-37.
As did Justices Jackson and Frankfurter in Youngstown, Justice Sutherland
viewed one branch's authority as dependent on the nature of the power exercised by the
other branch of government. Viewed this way the two strands of Curtiss-Wright were
both necessary to the opinion, although perhaps overstated, and the decision is in a
sense a corollary to the concurrences in Youngstown. Where Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter looked at the nature of congressional action in determining executive
power, Sutherland would analyze the nature of the presidential power in determining
the limits of permissible congressional delegation. Both perspectives rely on a common
view that one branch's power must often be determined not standing alone, but in
relationship to the authority or actions of another branch of government.
317 See L. HENKIN, supra note 159, at 149; 2 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOR-
EIGN RFLArIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303(b) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
318 See, e.g., Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940) ("[The Gen-
eral Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection] on ratifi-
cation became a part of our law. No special legislation . . . was necessary to make it
effective."); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) ("[The treaty with Japan
of April 5, 1911] operates itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national.").
319 See L. HENKIN, supra note 159, at 165.
320 1 RESTATEMENT, supra note 317, at § 131 comment i.
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guish it from . . . the power to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions."3 2' The distinction between the war powers and the other powers
delegated to Congress, therefore, must be rooted in the critical impor-
tance and special need for broad democratic discussion in any decision
to utilize force.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in upholding the
1975 treaty conveying the Panama Canal to the Republic of Panama,
distinguished between the article IV, section 3 power of Congress "to
dispose of. . .Property belonging to the United States" and the article
I, section 8 power to declare war. 2 While the constitutional grant of
power to Congress to dispose of United States property did not limit
the exercise of the treaty power, the court suggested that the article I,
section 8 grant of power to Congress might: "The sui generis nature of
a declaration of war and the unique history indicating the Framers'
desire to have both Houses of Congress concur in such a declaration,
may place it apart from the other congressional powers enumerated in
Art. I, § 8 and in Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
' 323
Just as article I must be read to require that two-thirds of the
Senate cannot authorize the president to fight a war without the con-
currence of the House of Representatives, so too one Congress may not
delegate the war power of a later Congress to the president. The prin-
ciple in both cases is the same: despite the general tendency to permit
the expansion of either a delegated or a treaty power, some areas, such
as the offensive use of force against another nation, are seen, both his-
torically and currently, as requiring more democratic decisionmaking.
Such decisions must be made by Congress rather than by the executive.
The historical catalogue that Justice Sutherland presented in Cur-
tiss-Wright to demonstrate the long-standing congressional practice of
delegating foreign affairs powers to the executive also supports the
reading of the opinion set out above.3 24 Although Congress has dele-
gated broad authority to the executive in a variety of foreign affairs
matters, the early leaders of the republic refused to delegate the power
to declare war or issue letters of marque and reprisal.3 25 In fact, none
321 Id. at reporter's note 6.
322 See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1057-59 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 907 (1978).
323 Id. at 1058 n.7.
324 See 299 U.S. at 322-29.
"' Proposed delegations to the executive of broad power to use force or raise ar-
mies were generally defeated. See, e.g., 19 ANNALS OF CONG. 1523-31 (1809) (Tenth
Cong., 2d Sess.) (defeating broad proposals authorizing the use of force); id. at 2279-80
(1808) (defeating effort to empower the president to expel British warships from Amer-
ican harbors); id. at 1857-60 (defeating proposal giving president discretion to increase
army on grounds that the bill contradicted constitutional mandate that Congress shall
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of the examples cited by Justice Sutherland involve decisions to launch
armed attacks against another country.32 Many of his examples in-
volve successful legislative delegations of foreign affairs power to the
executive in the early and mid-eighteenth century. 327 During the same
period, there were also several proposals made in Congress to authorize
the executive to commission private vessels or grant letters of marque
and reprisal against a nation with which the United States was at
peace. 328 On each occasion Congress rejected the attempt, refusing to
delegate broad discretion to the president to engage in hostilities that
could easily lead to full-scale war. These examples support the
nondelegation of the marque and reprisal power as powerfully as Jus-
tice Sutherland's catalogue supports delegation of residual foreign af-
fairs powers.
The first effort to delegate the marque and reprisal power to the
executive grew out of President Jefferson's attempt to deal with an in-
cipient war between the United States and the Barbary Powers. In
1801 President- Jefferson, unaware of Tripoli's declaration of war, 29
raise armies); 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 33-35 (1807) (Tenth Cong., 1st Sess.) (defeating
amendment to give president discretion in the application of a statute to suppress
piracy).
Other proposals were considerably narrowed to conform to executive authority to
defend the country from invasion or enforce congressional statutes. For example, a pro-
posal to authorize the president to raise a substantial army when he deemed it neces-
sary was objected to as an uncofistitutional delegation of the war power and defeated.
See 8 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 40, at 1526-27 (remarks of Rep. Gallatin). In-
stead, Congress authorized the president, "till the next meeting of Congress," to raise
troops only "in the event of a declaration of war against the United States or of an
actual invasion . . . or of imminent danger of such invasion discovered, in his opinion
to exist." 1 Stat. 5581, reprinted in id. at 1631, 1661-62. In 1792, a proposal was
made in the Senate to permit the president broad power to call out the militia. That
delegation was objected to and narrowed to providing power to call out the militia
"whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof be
obstructed . . . ." Other limiting conditions were also added. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG.
552-57, 574-76 (1792) (Second Cong., 1st Sess.); see Act of May 2, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat.
264 (president authorized to call in the militia whenever laws are opposed by combina-
tions too powerful to be controlled by the judiciary).
For more examples of narrowing proposed legislative delegations to grant the ex-
ecutive only such authority as would be necessary to defend the country from invasion
or enforce congressional statutes, see Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 95, 96 (per-
mitting president to call up militia when he judges such action necessary to protect
frontier from hostile incursions by Indians); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 384,
(authorizing the president to use force to prevent violation of Neutrality Act).
326 See 299 U.S. at 322-29.
327 See id.
32 For example, in 1810 Congress permitted the president to revive the embargo
against either Britain or France upon the occurrence of certain events, a delegation
later upheld by the Supreme Court. See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). The very same
Congress, however, refused to authorize a virtually identical delegation to issue letters
of marque and reprisal. See infra notes 338-45 and accompanying text.
119 See A. SOFAER, supra note 5, at 209.
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ordered a naval squadron to sail to Gibraltar to determine whether any
of the Barbary States had declared war on the United States,330 and to
destroy the ships and control the ports of any of them that had. 31
Later, after the squadron's tender vessel had engaged and defeated a
Tripolitan cruiser,3 32 Representative Samuel Smith introduced a reso-
lution in Congress that would enable the president to "'more effectu-
ally . . . protect the commerce of the United States against the Barbary
powers.' ,,333 The bill authorized the president "to commission private
vessels, with power to capture vessels of Tripoli." ' Representative
James Bayard sought to amend the resolution to authorize the presi-
dent to issue letters of marque and reprisal against Tunis and Algiers,
although these nations, unlike Tripoli, were not at war with the United
States. 35 Congressman Samuel Dana objected that such an amendment
appeared to invite war. 3 6 Despite Bayard's plea that broad discretion
should be granted the president to act offensively against "uncivilized"
nations, Congress refused to grant such broad discretion. 3 7 Thus, while
private ships could be commissioned in the context of a declared war,
Congress refused to allow the executive broad discretion to use private
ships to engage nations that had not declared war against the United
States.
In 1809 Congress again contemplated authorizing President Jef-
ferson to issue letters of marque and reprisal, this time against the Brit-
ish and French. Shortly before the termination of the Jeffersonian em-
bargo of 1807-1809, legislation was introduced in Congress to
authorize the president to issue letters of marque and reprisal against
either France or England, if either nation continued to enforce its edicts
830 See 1 NAVAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE UNITED STATES WAR WITH
THE BARBARY POWERS 465-69 (1939).
331 See E. CHANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN SYSTEM 39-40, VOL. 12 THE AMERI-
CAN NATION: A HISTORY 1906; A. SOFAER, supra note 5, at 210.
33' This engagement prompted Jefferson's well known statement that the Tripoli-
tan cruiser was freed after the battle because the squadron was "Julnauthorized by the
Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense." 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 103, at 327. Sofaer has cast
doubt on whether Jefferson's statement was made in good faith, or was merely a ploy
to obtain explicit congressional approval of military actions against Tripoli. See A.
SOFAER, supra note 5, at 212-14. Since war had been declared against the United
States by Tripoli, it seems clear that the president already had the authority to take
offensive actions against that nation. See id. at 213-14.
"I A. SOFAER, supra note 5, at 214 (quoting Rep. Samuel Smith).
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 406 (1802) (Seventh Cong., 1st Sess.).
See id. at 432-33.
338 See id. at 432.
337 See id. at 432-33; see also A. SOFAER, supra note 5, at 215-16 (stating that
the House of Representatives was "unwilling to delegate such authority even with re-
spect to 'uncivilized' nations").
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violating the neutral commerce of the United States after the other had
repealed such edicts."' 8 The bill was agreed to by the Senate over the
objection of Senator James Hillhouse, who argued:
The Constitution says, "The Congress shall have power
to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and
make rules concerning captures on land or water." The ex-
ercise of this authority, given by this section to the President,
to grant letters of marque and reprisal, is to rest on the revo-
cation or modification of the edicts of France or Great Brit-
ain, so as not to violate the neutral commerce of the United
States. And this complicated question is left to the judgment
and unlimited discretion of the President. His individual
opinion on the nature of a variety of edicts not specified, and
which will admit of various constructions, is to govern. If the
condition on which such a power was to be exercised, were
some specified event, certain and precise in point of fact,
which is not this case, it might be questioned whether the
Constitution would, even then, warrant Congress in delegat-
ing to the President the power of declaring war, or of grant-
ing letters of marque and reprisal.33 9
In the House of Representatives, the bill was objected to as an
unconstitutional delegation of the congressional war powers to the pres-
ident.3"4 Representative William Milnor noted "that the Constitution
of the United States provided that Congress alone should have the
power to declare war, and this bill, by giving the President a discretion
to judge when that war should commence, transferred the power to
338 See 19 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 325, at 425 (remarks of Sen. Hillhouse)
(quoting Section 11 of An Act to Interdict the Commercial Intercourse Between the
United States and Great Britain and France and Their Dependencies and for Other
Purposes. Section 11 authorized the president "in case either France or Great Britain
shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral
commerce of the United States, to declare the same by proclamation; and thereupon
cause to be issued letters of marque and reprisal against the nation thereafter continu-
ing in force its unlawful edicts."). Id.
"I Id. On February 20, 1809, Senator Reed had moved to delete from the bill
language granting the president power to issue letters of marque and reprisal, a motion
that failed by a vote of 14 to 11. See id. at 413. The bill then passed on February 21 by
a vote of 21 to 12. See id. at 436. When the House voted to delete the marque and
reprisal language from the bill, however, the Senate reversed its position. See id. at 451;
infra text accompanying notes 341-42. Prior to the vote, Hillhouse had remarked,
"This bill is covert war, and not only gives to the President of the United States the
power, but seems to lay him under a necessity of commencing active war; which by the
Constitution is confided only to Congress." Id. at 435.
340 See, e.g., id. at 1504 (statement of Rep. Livermore).
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him."34 Representative Edward Livermore agreed, noting, "The bill
did not contemplate a legislative act for issuing letters of marque or
reprisal against a particular enemy, but gave a power to the President
to choose with which of the belligerents . . . he would declare war."342
Although he thought the measure inexpedient, "that was a minor con-
sideration when put in competition with its unconstitutiohality." 4 3 The
House, by a wide margin, deleted the section, 44 a change agreed to by
the Senate. 45
Legislation to issue letters of marque and reprisal in time of for-
mal peace was last introduced during the administration of Andrew
Jackson. 4" Again, Congress refused to delegate this power to the exec-
utive. In his annual December message in 1834, President Jackson rec-
ommended that reprisals be undertaken if France did not comply with
a treaty it had entered into with the United States in 1831347 and urged
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Id. Representative Lyon agreed with Livermore and Milnor, see id. at 1504-
05, as did Representative Dana, who "objected to the bill because it transferred to the
President a legislative power, by making the issuing letters of marque dependent on the
events which in the opinion of the President should render the commerce of the United
States sufficiently safe . . . ." Id. at 1507-08. Dana also argued against the section
because "it authorized the employment of private force in a case in which the public
force was not to be employed, which is a novelty; it contemplated not actual war but
invited individual enterprise." Id. Representative Holland, however, defended the con-
stitutionality of the section, arguing that it "neither was a declaration of war, nor a
discretion to the President to make it .... [Moreover,] [iut conferred no legislative
power on the Executive. The event was fixed on the happening of which being made
known to the President, he should forthwith issue letters of marque and reprisal." Id,
at 1505.
344 See id. at 1517. The vote was 74 to 33 in favor of striking the language. Many
of those who voted in the majority may have done so because they were opposed to
warlike measures against Great Britain or because they viewed this measure as half-
hearted and unwise, rather than because they thought it was unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
id. at 1510 (statement of Rep. Eppes); id. (statement of Rep. Williams); id. at 1508-09
(statement of Rep. Randolph). It is clear, however, that substantial, if not majority,
support existed for the view that the marque and reprisal section was unconstitutional,
and that its unconstitutionality was its fatal flaw. A delegation of power to the presi-
dent to use the public and private armed forces against the British or French, should
either refuse to revoke its edicts, was defeated on similar grounds. See, e.g., id. at 1526
(statement of Rep. Gardenier that the bill was an unconstitutional delegation of the
war power).
141 See id. at 451. Two years later, there was some discussion of the vote denying
the president the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal against a nation that
refused to revoke its edicts. Representative Anderson noted that while President Jeffer-
son wanted the authority, Congress should avoid taking such a measure, since "the
correctness of such a course might well be doubted, upon Constitutional grounds." 23
ANNALS OF CONG. 66 (1811) (Twelfth Cong., 1st Sess.).
346 These were the last letters authorized during the War of 1812, in which
American privateers played an important part. See A. SOFAER, supra note 5, at 270-
71.
347 See 7 J. MOORE, supra note 43, at 123-24; 3 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
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Congress to issue letters of marque and reprisal against France if it did
not take steps to comply. 4 As in the embargo context, the president
would determine when the triggering event had taken place.349 The
Senate unanimously refused to enact any legislation authorizing repri-
sals against France.3 50 Senator Henry Clay noted:
[T]he authority to grant letters of marque and reprisal being
specially delegated to Congress, Congress ought to retain to
itself the right of judging of the expediency of granting them
under all the circumstances existing at the time when they
are proposed to be actually issued. The committee are not
satisfied that Congress can, constitutionally, delegate this
right."5'
The Intelligence Authorization Act, by treating all covert action
under one statute, has thus failed to distinguish between two types of
covert action containing different constitutional consequences. Most
covert operations merely implicate the general foreign affairs powers of
Congress and the president; covert paramilitary actions intrude upon
congressional war powers, powers that Congress may not delegate.3 "
The historical evidence demonstrates that the marque and reprisal
power cannot be constitutionally delegated to the president by Con-
gress. Although the Supreme Court has upheld broad congressional
delegations in the foreign affairs area, these delegations have involved
areas where the executive had "residual" foreign affairs powers, and
provide no support for the delegation of Congress's powers to declare
war and issue letters of marque and reprisal. Although the necessities
of government in the modern administrative state have wrought great
changes in the nondelegation doctrine, gravely important powers that
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 90, at 88.
See S. Doc. No. 40, 23d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1835), reprinted in 7 J. MOORE,
supra note 43, at 126-27 (report of Mr. Clay, Committee on Foreign Relations).
"I See 7 J. MOORE, supra note 43, at 127.
350 See id. at 124.
351 Id. at 126-27 (emphasis added).
352 Some members of Congress have begun to recognize that a distinction must be
made between paramilitary operations and other forms of covert action such as covert
propaganda, influence buying, and so forth. In 1983, Congressman Fowler introduced
a bill, H.R. 3872, that required "explicit [congressional] authorization for any clandes-
tine paramilitary or military activity." Oversight Hearings, supra note 201, at 4. The
bill sought to separate out the "most questionable category of covert aid, namely
paramilitary or military activities [and subject them] to a more rigorous congressional
authorization process." Id. Hearings were held on the measure although it was never
enacted. Fowler's efforts and the recent Hamilton bill with respect to Angola, see supra
note 216, indicate a growing understanding in Congress that paramilitary operations
present a different problem than the other forms of covert action.
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the Framers placed in the legislative branch with the specific intent
that executive power in those areas be either restrained or denied en-
tirely cannot be constitutionally delegated.
CONCLUSION
The increasing use of covert paramilitary operations as an instru-
ment of United States foreign policy raises substantial constitutional
questions about which branch of government has the power to author-
ize such activity. Thus far the answer has been to assume executive
authority. The intent of the Framers, however, was different. By grant-
ing Congress the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal, the
Constitution recognizes that the use of private forces to conduct hostili-
ties should be carefully circumscribed and not left to executive discre-
tion. That constitutional judgment is even more important in today's
world, in which private armies have reemerged as an important de-
structive force, serving as important actors in many of the world's most
dangerous problems: terrorism, the Middle East crisis, and Central
America. Congress can and must assert its authority over such private
warfare. To refuse to do so is to abdicate its constitutional
responsibility.
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